TRAINING MANUAL
for Ambulance and Pre-Hospital Response in Risk Situations – A PILOT
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Violence and threatening behaviour towards ambulance providers have become a worrying global trend. They occur not only where there is armed conflict, but also in countries at peace. Every day, ambulance providers and other health personnel are exposed to violence as they carry out their duties. They might be verbally threatened or physically assaulted, even murdered. When ambulance services are impeded, citizens, including children, can be deprived of vital emergency care.

The main focus for ambulance providers is always to save lives. Many staff may feel a sense of contradiction between this duty and putting their own safety first. However, preparing for situations where your team is under threat or attack should be a priority; for responders, being aware that they will enter situations where they may not have a full overview of the risks will help them to meet challenges as safely and effectively as possible.

This training manual is designed to be easily used, and relevant for ambulance providers in operational services worldwide. It should be implemented based on an assessment of the context in which the ambulance providers operates, and of the current standard operating procedures that the ambulance service follows in order to mitigate risk. It focuses on individual protective behaviour, and highlights the active role responders can play in reducing the incidence of violence and threats. Ambulance providers are encouraged to make contributions, according to their experiences and knowledge, while using the training manual.

The overall goals of this training manual are to:
• Equip ambulance providers with simple practical skills to improve their security and mitigate the impact of violence;
• Offer a starting point for organisations providing ambulance and pre-hospital services seeking to review and reinforce their existing procedures in terms of preparedness and security management.

One thing is certain: violence against ambulance providers is unacceptable.
Violence can include threats, harassment, intimidation, robbery, injury, killing and kidnapping. It hinders ambulance providers from performing their medical duties. Violence can have both physical and psychological impacts. WHO defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”

Healthcare personnel includes all those working in the area of healthcare. For example:
- Those with professional healthcare qualifications, including paramedics, nurses, doctors and pharmacists;
- Those who work in hospitals, ambulance stations, communal health facilities and administrative functions associated with health;
- Medical personnel of armed forces;
- Staff and volunteers of the ICRC Movement involved in the delivery of healthcare;
- Personnel of health-oriented international and non-governmental organisations;
- First-aiders.

Hazard or danger, and hazardous or dangerous situations are situations or events with the potential to compromise the health and safety of ambulance providers, or delivery of services and/or the operational continuity of an organisation or service.

Risk can be defined as the probability of violation or threats, abuse, harm and suffering.

Safer behaviour is a behaviour that gives a person or an organisation better protection from recognised hazards that are likely to cause harm.

A security incident is a dangerous incident that leads to or may lead to an accident. An accident is an undesired event that results in harm. In this manual, only incidents and accidents relating to the provision of ambulance and pre-hospital services will be dealt with.
Physical assaults, verbal abuse, denial of access to those in need of assistance, and threats of violence are just a few examples of how violence affects EMS and ambulance providers worldwide. Whether they operate in a zone affected by armed conflict or in a country at peace, the reality is that ambulance providers are working in high-risk environments. The risks and their consequences vary from context to context, but the better prepared the providers of emergency assistance are, the more securely they will be able to fulfill their duties.

The purpose of this training manual is to help ambulance providers to reflect on how to mitigate risk. This includes how to prepare for dealing with occurrences and consequences of threats and violence.

This training manual is about prevention and mitigation. It focuses on risk awareness and on the role of ambulance providers in preventing or reducing security incidents before, during and after the delivery of health services. Through the process described in the training, participants will develop a basic set of informed and contextual recommendations on how to deliver services more safely.

BACKGROUND
The idea of developing this training manual is linked to the work of the Community of Action for Ambulance and Pre-Hospital Care Providers (CoA), established in 2016 under the auspices of the Health Care in Danger Initiative (HCiD). The CoA is a network of ambulance providers who discuss challenges and share best practices, with the overall objective of improving the security of their services. In 2016 and 2017, the CoA held online exercises for operational staff to facilitate mapping of the types of violence occurring in different contexts. Case studies developed in the framework of these workshops also revealed gaps in the prevailing response to violence against EMS. This led to the development of this training manual, which is intended to complement existing approaches and tools, such as Ambulance and Pre-Hospital Services in Risk Situations, Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations, Training Manual on Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Facilities and the Safer Access Framework.
WHO SHOULD USE THE TRAINING MANUAL?
This training manual is designed to be used by ambulance providers, with some aspects requiring a broader engagement from the whole organisation providing the services. The manual is designed to be a ‘toolkit’ to help deliver training that is appropriate for a given context. It is not a ‘one size fits all’ solution, so it may be that users will utilise certain sections to strengthen their existing training or choose to use the whole content.

HOW TO USE THE TRAINING MANUAL
The training manual provides an overall conceptual and methodological approach to help ambulance providers increase their resilience in the face of risks encountered as they work. Rather than a prescriptive how-to guide, the training manual offers general guidance, with some examples. This can be applied to a broad variety of contexts and scenarios, and can be adapted according to local practices.

Part 2 of the training manual is designed to actively involve participants in the learning process, to develop practical recommendations for context-specific situations. The participants will be guided through points of reflection, discussions and group work. The participatory approach is a key element in ensuring contextualisation and ownership of the recommendations developed.

This training will result in a set of recommendations that can be implemented in an ambulance and pre-hospital setting. These recommendations could then be presented to operational management.

It is recognised that the entire manual represents a relatively large amount of training time, which may not be possible in all settings. It is left up to those using the manual to decide who should receive the training, and how much of the content they want to deliver based on the resources they have available. There may be elements that are suitable for initial training for all providers, but the manual is designed primarily as ongoing education for ambulance providers with some operational experience.

The manual is designed to be used electronically, but also contains QR Code links so that a printed version retains some functionality. Clicking on the QR code in the electronic version will take the reader to the desired resource without needing to use the QR code.
STRUCTURE OF THE TRAINING MANUAL
The training manual is in two parts. Part 1 introduces participants to the HCID initiative of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which aims to address violence against healthcare. Then it gives an overview of the legal framework around the protection of healthcare in situations of armed conflict, other emergencies and situations of peace. Finally, the reader is presented with a risk-management approach that can be used to address challenges that ambulance providers face in their day-to-day operations.

Part 2 of the manual is a set of sessions intended to support the implementation of the proposed methodology and identify relevant context-specific measures for risk mitigation. This process is largely informed by the Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations report, which is a collection of lessons learnt from twelve National Societies with extensive operational experience in the ambulance and pre-hospital sector. These modules will provide the reader with insight and inspiration on how to address the challenges that they are faced with.
HEALTHCARE IN DANGER
Why we should learn about Health Care in Danger

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST HEALTHCARE

Violence against healthcare occurs in conflict and non-conflict zones, and may take many forms, depending on the context and circumstances. It affects all layers of healthcare systems, including patients and their families, all types of healthcare personnel including ambulance providers and medical facilities. EMS are often a first point of contact for those in need, hence their increased exposure to violence and security incidents. Numbers of reported incidents show only the tip of the iceberg as in most contexts it is difficult, even impossible, to track all the incidents and those affected.

Between 2015 and 2017, the ICRC recorded more than 1,200 incidents of violence against healthcare in 16 countries where it operates, with destruction of or damage to medical transport or medical facilities among the most frequent acts. With 25 per cent of incidents occurring at checkpoints, border crossings or in public places where both patients and healthcare personnel are more vulnerable, the importance of undertaking measures to improve acceptance of and respect for ambulance providers is clear. (Adapted from Gathering Evidence-Based Data on Violence Against Health Care, see QR code below.)

Violence against healthcare deprives access to life-saving assistance when it is most needed. There is a knock-on effect on the entire health system, hindering the provision of preventive and curative health for patients suffering from chronic diseases or accessing public-health services such as vaccination, maternal or neonatal care. For example, damage inflicted on medical transport or health facilities may render them inoperative or may seriously limit their capacity. What has been developed over years can be destroyed in seconds. In a similar vein, the impact of attacks against ambulance providers should be measured in terms not only of how many of them have been killed or wounded but also of how many leave their places of work to seek refuge in safer areas. Some may choose to abandon their profession, given the traumas experienced. As a result, not only patients and their families, but other individuals and entire communities may be deprived of access to healthcare services. Re-creating these capacities takes years.

Gathering evidence-based data on violence against healthcare

How often does violence against healthcare personnel occur?
Zero tolerance for violence and respect towards healthcare!
ICRC | HCID 2020

tinyurl.com/3c4jcx46

PART ONE – HEALTHCARE IN DANGER
Every week, around the world, hospitals, medical personnel and aid workers come under attack. They are not a target.

Given the multifaceted nature of violence against healthcare, any attempt to tackle its causes and consequences necessarily requires the involvement of different actors and actions. For example, states must ensure the protection of health services by adopting relevant legislation; weapon bearers need to respect healthcare and comply with relevant legal provisions; healthcare personnel, medical transport and health facilities can implement preventive measures to increase their security and preparedness to withstand the consequences of violence.

The problem of violence against healthcare has been raised by the RCRC Movement via the Health Care in Danger initiative. This initiative seeks to shed light on the prevalence of violence affecting healthcare providers, and to promote the implementation of practical measures to improve their security at local, regional and national levels. In bringing together states, weapon bearers, the healthcare community, humanitarian agencies and anyone else concerned with the issue, the HCiD initiative emphasises that everyone has a role to play in preventing such violence and ensuring safer delivery of and access to healthcare. Bringing in experts and practitioners from the above-mentioned constituencies, the initiative aims to map and identify measures that can be implemented to ensure safe access to and protection of health services.

Extra resources

HCID: Making the Case
ICRC | HCiD 2011 tinyurl.com/4zymyys

Video: The Human Cost (13:49)
On The Frontline ICRC 2013 tinyurl.com/yckjb253

Video: Protecting Healthcare Together (2:42) ICRC | HCiD 2015 tinyurl.com/rez5juwn

1 See link on page 10 under Ambulance And Pre-Hospital Services in Risk Situations

2 See link on page 10 under Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations
The rights and responsibilities of ambulance providers are anchored in international and domestic law, and will vary according to whether the response takes place in a conflict zone, another emergency or a peaceful environment. Rights and responsibilities will also differ for military and civilian healthcare. International humanitarian law is the specialised legal framework for armed conflict (either international or non-international), and provides rules that are binding on the parties to a conflict. International human rights law and domestic law apply in all situations (unless the state makes a derogation which may be permissible in a state of emergency) and regulates the relationship between the state and its citizens or between citizens. International humanitarian law seeks to minimise the suffering and loss of dignity caused by being wounded or falling sick during an armed conflict, in other emergencies or in peacetime by protecting the provision of impartial and effective healthcare. Therefore, healthcare personnel, medical facilities and transports are afforded special rights and protections. It should be noted that these rights and protections are not fixed; they can vary according to the circumstances and applicable legal framework. They are also accompanied by a set of responsibilities. Ambulance providers should have a sound grasp of these rights and responsibilities, and should understand how they may change in the context of an armed conflict.

This part of the training manual covers the ways in which international law protects ambulance providers, both during armed conflict and in peacetime. It will identify relevant international and national laws regulating and protecting ambulance and ambulance providers, and give a basic understanding of the domestic legal framework.

Rights and responsibilities of healthcare personnel

E-learning: The rights and responsibilities of healthcare personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies.

HCID

tinyurl.com/ysj7n4e
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Protection offered by the international framework can be divided roughly into three main elements: (1) protection of the wounded and sick; (2) protection of healthcare personnel, facilities and medical transports; and (3) the use of the distinctive emblems (red cross/red crescent/red crystal).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW</th>
<th>INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The wounded and sick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a right to adequate medical treatment without discrimination, which corresponds to an obligation for healthcare personnel to provide such treatment where possible.</td>
<td>Have similar rights: access to healthcare services of sufficient quality, information, and in absence of discrimination, enshrined under the right to health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parties to the conflict must facilitate access and may not order healthcare personnel to give priority to any person except on medical grounds. ⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shall be respected and protected and shall not be the object of attack.</td>
<td>Have the right to undertake their duties to provide healthcare without undue interference from the authorities, and in line with healthcare ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under no circumstances shall medical units be used to shield military objectives from attack.</td>
<td>The right to health imposes an obligation on authorities to respect and protect the provision of healthcare and address any imbalances in it. ⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May not be required to give priority to any person except on medical ground and decide, in accordance with medical ethics, which patient receives priority.</td>
<td>Healthcare personnel who overstep their medical functions may be subject to penal, administrative and disciplinary sanctions in accordance with relevant domestic law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shall not be hindered in the performance of their exclusively medical tasks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to a conflict shall not harass or punish healthcare personnel for performing activities compatible with healthcare ethics, nor shall they compel them to perform activities contrary to healthcare ethics or to refrain from performing acts required by healthcare ethics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should not be compelled, unless required to do so by the law, to give information concerning the wounded and sick who are or have been under their care, if this information would prove harmful to the patients or their families.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties: healthcare personnel must protect the confidentiality of patient information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on the protection afforded: Medical transports cease to be protected when they are used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the enemy. ⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ Denial of medical treatment without justified cause may constitute cruel or inhuman treatment, an outrage upon human dignity (in particular in case of humiliating and degrading treatment), or even torture if the necessary criteria are met. ⁵ Examples of “acts harmful to the enemy” include, inter alia, transport of troops that are not wounded or sick, arms or munitions, as well as the collection or transmission of military intelligence. Even if acts harmful to the enemy are committed, a warning must be given, setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time limit for compliance. Healthcare personnel, units and transports lose their protection only when such a warning remains unheeded and an attack is launched against them. ⁶ It should be noted, however, that the extent to which this right is upheld varies.
Health Care in Danger: the legal framework

An excellent and easily digestible overview of rules protecting healthcare, including rules about the emblem.

tinyurl.com/mha8j7eb

Figure 1: The red cross, red crescent and red crystal

Video: What’s the difference between the red cross, red crescent and red crystal? (1:45)

The red cross, red crescent and red crystal are symbols of protection. Individuals, ambulances and facilities displaying the emblem are afforded special protections when engaged in medical functions. They can lose these protections if they are involved in acts of perfidy and may therefore be attacked.

tinyurl.com/2k7keene

IMPROPER USE

“Improper use refers to any use other than that for which the distinctive emblems were intended, namely the identification of medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports, as well as personnel and property of the components of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.” (Customary IHL, Rule 59. Improper Use of the Distinctive Emblems of the Geneva Conventions (icrc.org))

Figure 2

EXAMPLE OF LEGAL AND CORRECT USE DURING ARMED CONFLICT

It is vital to be aware of the importance of using the emblems correctly at all times.

The emblems:
- Are recognised by States;
- Are free from any religious, cultural or political meanings, and offer protection;
- Should be used to clearly mark medical units and transport;
- Ambulance providers should wear armlets and carry identity cards displaying the emblem.

Figure 3

YOUR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS A HEALTHCARE PROVIDER IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Domestic law will have integrated provisions that reflect international law, including IHL and IHRL, to varying degrees. Ambulance providers should familiarise themselves with the relevant national legislation in order to ensure that they act in accordance with the legal environment within which they operate. This will allow them to make use of protection afforded by the law, and also avoid undertaking any action that may be contrary to the law.

The rights and obligations set forth in the international framework should be incorporated into each national legal framework, normally in the legislation relating to the healthcare system. Additionally, relevant provisions can be found in legislation pertaining to the working environment, as well as public welfare and insurance legislation. Breaches of rights and obligations are normally regulated in the penal code or in applicable administrative or disciplinary regulations.

It is important to be familiar with the roles, rights and responsibilities assigned to healthcare personnel in the national legal framework, including who is defined as protected healthcare personnel in times of peace, disaster, crisis and armed conflict situations, as these may vary.
In addition, a reflection on relevant domestic laws should include an overview of the ethical principles for healthcare services, as these also constitute rules that ambulance providers need to follow.

Below are suggestions for discussing applicable rights and responsibilities for ambulance providers.

• What provisions exist to protect patients/the wounded and sick in the relevant context?
• What provisions exist for the protection of ambulance providers and/or other medical personnel?
• Are the rights and obligations of personnel involved in ambulance and pre-hospital services and medical transports clearly spelt out in your national legislation, and what are they?
• Does the national legislation contain provisions on the protection of ambulance providers and unhindered access to the wounded and the sick?
• Are there any elements relating to the security of the service specified in the law or agreement?
• What national legal protection is afforded by the red cross or red crescent emblem and/or other logos used by the ambulance and pre-hospital services?
• Does the national legislation contain provisions on authorisation to use the protective emblem?

SUMMARY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL

Healthcare personnel are given certain protections in international and domestic legislative frameworks to ensure that the wounded and sick are given access to necessary treatment. The rights afforded to healthcare personnel are accompanied by a number of obligations, which may involve actions (e.g. caring for the wounded and the sick humanely, effectively and impartially) and/or abstentions (including from experimenting on people, supporting illegal interrogatory techniques that may amount to torture or transporting weapons). 7

7 See the HCID report on the rights and responsibilities of healthcare personnel.

PART ONE – THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

RESOURCES

Written resources on IHL and IHRL

- Basics of IHL: tinyurl.com/mr-bakat6
- Comprehensive introduction to IHL: tinyurl.com/3lyleaz2
- IHL app: tinyurl.com/37ve2zvfb
- IHL database: tinyurl.com/2zv84bd

Introduction to International Humanitarian Law

Addressed to humanitarian practitioners, policy makers and other professionals who seek to understand how and when this body of law applies, and whom it protects.

(Produced by Kaya: a free humanitarian learning platform) tinyurl.com/4p8ezwvyk
THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

Derived from the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and enshrined in international humanitarian law. They are to form the basis for all humanitarian action in both conflict situations and natural disasters, as set out in UN General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and 58/114. The four principles are:

HUMANITY
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.

NEUTRALITY
Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

IMPARTIALITY
Humanitarian action must make no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.

OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
This training manual is intended to improve the way risks related to the provision of ambulance and pre-hospital services are assessed and addressed. The methodology supports the processes of identifying and ranking existing risks, and of designing adequate applicable mitigation measures to address them.

The methodology is based on a recognised International Organization for Standardization (ISO) risk-management approach to mitigating risks. The aim of this approach is to make sure that risk assessments are done systematically and objectively so that interventions effectively address the most prominent risks, allowing ambulance and pre-hospital services to continue, and communities to be safely assisted as required.

The ISO risk-management model is a typical programme-management cycle model that needs to be continuously applied to provide the full scope of benefits for the organisation.

A proper analysis of the context in which one organisation or one specific service operates allows for the implementation of a full risk-assessment process to take place, in which all the stakeholders contribute to identifying the most prominent hazards and the situations in which ambulance and pre-hospital services are likely to be confronted with them. Context analysis also allows for the identification of the most effective and
appropriate risk-mitigation measures in light of the resources available, and for processes
to mobilise said resources by involving the relevant stakeholders within and outside the
organisation. Such a cycle requires all the different steps, decisions and actions planned
and undertaken to be recorded and reported, monitored and reviewed in order to
costantly adapt to changing situations and foster learning from past experience.

This chapter will provide the theoretical elements that will allow practitioners to under-
stand and apply the methodology.

Risk management is already applied by many organisations, in one way or another, to aid
decision-making at different levels. The RCRC Movement has developed a series of tools,
such as the different dashboards that are used in many conflict settings, aimed to identify,
monitor and mitigate risks faced by the organisation itself (such as financial or logistical
risks), as well as its staff and volunteers. Those tools support the decision-making process.

SAFER ACCESS FRAMEWORK

One of the most common tools integrating the risk-management approach within the
RCRC Movement is the Safer Access Framework (SAF).

The SAF is an approach developed by ICRC and more than 50 National Societies, which
aims to increase acceptance, security and access to people and communities in need,
especially in sensitive and insecure contexts. It is made up of eight sections (elements)
containing actions and measures that can be integrated into operational work according
to context-specific priorities. The eight elements of the SAF are like links in a chain:
interlinked and interdependent.

Safer Access Framework: resource centre

Visit the SAF page to find various resources, including a meth-
odology for applying the framework, and videos from risk
assessment to how to reinforce the eight elements of SAF.

tinyurl.com/yk4uytsj

Legend

I. Context and risk assessment
   National Societies have a clear understanding of the interlinked political, social, cultural
   and economic aspects of the evolving operational environment and the inherent risks,
   which forms the basis for preventing and managing those risks.

II. Legal and policy base
    National Societies have sound legal and statutory instruments and develop policies that
    provide a basis from which to carry out their humanitarian mandate and roles in con-
    formity with Movement policies, international humanitarian law and domestic legislation.

III. Acceptance of the organisation
     National Societies have attained a high degree of acceptance among key stakeholders
     by providing relevant, context-sensitive humanitarian assistance and protection for
     people and communities in a manner consistent with the Fundamental Principles and
     other Movement policies.

IV. Acceptance of the individual
    Staff and volunteers have attained a high degree of acceptance among key stakeholders
    by working in a manner consistent with the Fundamental Principles and other
    Movement policies.

V. Identification
    National Societies take all necessary steps to protect and promote the organisation’s
    visual identity and that of its staff and volunteers.

VI. Internal communication and coordination
    National Societies implement well-developed internal communication and coordination
    strategies and mechanisms, which enhance coordination with other Movement
    components.

VII. External communication and coordination
     National Societies implement well-developed external communication and coordination
     strategies and mechanisms, which enhance coordination with external actors.

VIII. Operational security risk management
      National Societies assume responsibility and accountability for the safety and security
      of staff and volunteers by developing and implementing an operational security
      risk-management system, and structure.

Figure 5: Elements of the Safer Access Framework

Actions taken or not taken in connection with one element may often have an impact on
the others. A chain is only as strong as each of its links; should one be weak or break, it
would have a negative effect on the chain as a whole.

The Framework is underpinned by the Safer Access Cycle – access, perception, acceptance,
security – and reinforced through use of the Fundamental Principles to guide operati-
onal communication, practice, thinking processes and decisions.

Fundamental Principles

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Ethics and Tools for Human-
itarian Action.

tinyurl.com/2p833sw
RISK ASSESSMENT

Once a series of hazards has been identified, via consultation with the relevant stakeholders, around the planning, managing and delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services, the associated risks must be given grades. The higher the grade, the more acute the risk, and the higher the priority of managing it.

A full procedure for conducting a risk assessment for ambulance and pre-hospital services can be found on page 153 in annex 1.

The risk-assessment guidelines provided in this document apply only to hazards associated with the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services. They do not apply to any other hazards or threats posed to the organisation, which may be included in a broader, organisation-wide security-risk assessment.

Risks associated with a hazardous or dangerous situation depend on a combination of the following elements:

- The SEVERITY of harm that can result from the danger in question;
- The LIKELIHOOD of a harmful event, referred to in the table below as the “probability of occurrence”, which is a function of: a hazardous event occurring, exposure to the hazardous or dangerous situation and possible ways of avoiding or limiting the harm.

Assessing risks associated with the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services involves:

- Identifying the hazard and the potential severity of an incident’s impact on ambulance providers and/or delivery of the service;
- Assessing the likelihood of an incident, given the frequency of previous occurrences, the vulnerability of ambulance providers and services to the risk, and their ability to limit or reduce any resulting harm.

In terms of managing risks related to the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services, the likelihood and severity of a given impact are determined by:

- The type of danger in question;
- The frequency of incidents caused by the danger in question;
- The vulnerability of ambulance providers to the potential impact of the danger (including their level of exposure to the danger, their capacity to reduce or limit their exposure, and the harm that the hazard may cause).

Using predefined scoring criteria, the likelihood and severity of an incident are plotted onto a risk matrix, illustrating the risk associated with each identified hazard that may impede the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services.

The risk matrix allows you to see and show the risk associated with one hazard at a certain moment. Using such a matrix supports the decision-making process linked to identifying appropriate mitigation measures. It shows the evolution of risk associated with one hazard over time, in relation to the impact of internal and external factors.

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9 tinyurl.com/mrysprpb | Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change (icrc.org)
10 An incident is a hazardous event that leads or could lead to an accident. An accident is an undesired event that results in harm. In this manual, only incidents and accidents relating to the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services will be dealt with.
Once a risk associated with a specific hazard is mapped, discussion within the organisation should then lead to a decision on whether the risk level, as mapped, is acceptable or not. If the organisation is satisfied with a certain risk level, no further action needs to be taken. If the risk level is deemed unacceptable, or has become unacceptable over time due to a change of situation, measures must be implemented to address the situation, with the objective of bringing the risk level down to an acceptable level.

Deciding what indicators to use should be a collective endeavour, with consultations involving all stakeholders, and results widely communicated internally. It is important for ambulance providers to understand and accept the risk-assessment process and its outcome, and essential for ambulance providers directly involved in the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services.

### Figures

#### Figure 8: Risk matrix assessing the risk of weapon contamination on the civilian population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEVERITY OF IMPACT / CONSEQUENCES</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: indicators regarding severity of impact are only examples and must be defined by the organisation.

### Risk Assessment

Once every relevant hazard is identified, and associated risk plotted in the risk matrix, the next stage is to identify, prioritise and plan activities to deal with the risks that are deemed unacceptable so they can eventually be moved to a lower category in the risk matrix, until they are at a level where the organisation feels safe enough to operate.

### Acceptable Risk

All human activity involves risk in one way or another. It is not possible to achieve absolute safety in the face of all dangers. This said, the risk of injury during the provision of healthcare should be kept as low as possible, or at a level that is predefined as acceptable.

It is not easy to gauge acceptable risk levels. These depend on what the ambulance providers themselves, the organisation, society and politicians consider to be normal. Utility value and cost are two factors that always tend to come into play when we look at the degree of risk from a societal perspective.

The concept of acceptable risk refers to a level of risk that is considered to be tolerable for the majority. This could be in terms of reputation, financial or material loss or even the risk of loss of life. The notion of acceptable risk, the parameters within which an organisation feels safe to operate, will greatly vary from one organisation to another, and within one organisation with respect to changing external factors. A drastic example of this is when a conflict suddenly erupts in a given region. The extent of what is deemed acceptable risk will be greatly influenced by the context.

It is important that any organisation undertakes the process of clearly defining and internally communicating the thresholds of acceptable risks, before using the data to correctly plot each identified situation in the risk matrix.

An example of a risk-assessment protocol can be found on page 159 in annex 2.

### Risk Mitigation

Using a graphic matrix that integrates the most relevant hazards and associated risks will help to illustrate the consolidated situation, and facilitate decisions about which risks to address first.

Once a risk has been assessed, a risk-treatment option should be chosen. The ISO defines the following risk-treatment measures:

- Avoiding the risk by not starting, or by stopping, an activity that gives rise to the risk;
- Accepting the risk in order to pursue an important activity;
- Removing the risk source;
- Changing the likelihood associated with the risk;
- Changing the consequence associated with the risk;
- Sharing the risk with another party or other parties (through collaborative projects, for instance).

In most environments in which ambulance providers operate, it is usually not feasible to remove all risk sources (i.e. checkpoints, traffic-related problems, hostile population, etc. nor is it standard practice to transfer the risk, although it may be shared through collaboration with other actors. Accepting the risk may be an option in some instances, after careful consideration and in agreement with the organisation's management as to which risks are acceptable. Avoiding the risk means not engaging in or ending operations in certain circumstances; this may be an option in the event of heavy shelling or other situations where the threat to ambulance providers cannot be mitigated. Removing the risk source is the most effective risk-reduction measure, but it is often not a realistic option.

Traditionally, mitigation measures that an organisation can implement are a mixture of the following:

- Adapted standard operating procedures (SOP) around planning and delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services (including contingency plans in case of incidents);
- Adapted equipment supporting the above;
- Training (and retraining) on the implementation of procedures and use of equipment.

In part 2, you will find a series of examples of mitigation measures that have been identified by peer practitioners to be relevant in the frame of your activity.

An example of a risk mitigation measure can be found on page 161 in annex 3

MONITORING AND REVIEWING RISK

Risks evolve and in order to manage them over time, ensuring that the organisation deploys its limited resources to address the most pressing risks, they must be regularly assessed.

Monitoring risk involves:

- Re-evaluating the environment and potential severity of impact;
- Assessing changes that may affect the vulnerability of ambulance providers and/or the likelihood of an incident.

Ambulance providers can revise entries to the risk-assessment matrix if necessary, and confirm that risk-mitigation measures still address the highest-priority risks.

It is worth noting that downgrading a risk category on the risk assessment matrix may demonstrate that mitigation measures are working, or the improvement may be the result of other non-attributable factors, such as the cessation of hostilities.
PART 2: WORKSHOP SESSIONS

SESSION 0: SETTING THE SCENE

This training manual is designed to be used by ambulance providers, although some aspects require engagement from the wider organisation. It is a toolkit to help deliver training that is relevant to any given context, so you might incorporate a few sections into your existing training or you might choose to use the whole content.

Part 2 presents a training programme for contextualising risk management and safer behaviour. It uses a wide range of training methods, including reflections, active discussions, role-play, individual and group activities.

Together with the information presented in part 1, these resources are background material that should be studied by the facilitator and the participants in preparation for the training.

Important! Always make an agreement with management before initiating this training. This is to ensure organisational support and to secure the willingness to implement change.

Use your judgement as a trainer to adapt the training to the needs of the participants and the situations they work in. We recommend that you vary the methods to accommodate all types of participants and to keep the training interesting.

The suggested training programme below shows the sessions and activities in part 2, and gives an indication of time management for the sessions. It does not include breaks, meals or energisers. Create your own schedule and plan the programme to suit your local needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SESSIONS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Setting the scene</td>
<td>• Introduction of trainers and participants, including ground rules • Expectations and aims • Basic rules • Introduction to the workshop</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Violence against ambulance providers</td>
<td>• Violence against ambulance providers • Different perceptions • Impact of violence</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUGGESTED TRAINING PROGRAMME
### SESSIONS | ACTIVITIES | PROPOSED TIME
--- | --- | ---
**CONTEXTUALISING RISK MANAGEMENT**
2 | Using risk methodology  
• Familiarising with the concepts of risk  
• Managing the risks  
• Incident reporting/template | 3 hours 45 mins

**CONTEXTUALISING SAFER BEHAVIOUR**
3 | Security and behaviour  
• Safer Access Framework  
• Code of Conduct  
• Uniforms and other means of identification  
• Who are we communicating with?  
• Situational awareness  
• Culture, religion, tradition | 3 hours 45 mins

4 | Managing aggression and interpersonal violence  
• Contextualising why aggressions occur  
• Human needs and the basic emotions  
• Vital space  
• Contextualising good communication  
• Active listening  
• Non-violent communication  
• Escalating and de-escalating reactions | 8 hours 35 mins

5 | Stress and psychosocial wellbeing  
• Contextualising stress factors  
• Contextualising stress management | 3 hours 45 mins

6 | Recommendations and action cards  
• Consolidating learning from all the previous sessions  
• Recommendations for management  
• Action cards for pockets  
• Evaluation and closure | 2 hours 45 mins

**PROPOSED TIME IN TOTAL (WITHOUT BREAKS)** 29 HOURS

### PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR

**Venue**
- Access to the premises, including bus or train stations nearby, and parking
- Appropriate temperature and lighting in the room
- Familiarise yourself with evacuation and safety procedures

**Prepare the facilities**
- Consider how to set up the room to encourage participation and comfort

**Materials**
- Registration form for the participants to list their contact information
- Printed copies of training handouts if needed
- Pens and pencils
- Notepaper and post-its
- Whiteboard or flipcharts with stand
- Markers

**Other**
- Determine whether someone is available to provide psychosocial support should there be adverse reactions to some of the content of the workshop (see annex 5 on page 174, an example of how to manage difficult reactions and disclosures)
- Become acquainted with the reading material offered, as well as various resource materials that may come in useful
- Prepare the daily agenda including breaks. (Please note that this is a set of tools to help you develop a workshop that suits your context. The proposed agenda for the session is only a suggestion. It is recommended that you tailor the structure to your needs and your context. You need to design your own timetable)
- Utensils and beverages
- Plan snacks, water, tea and coffee or meals if these will be provided
- Consider if you require a co-trainer or someone to support you with time management, mealtimes, or to write down key points from discussion groups on the board or flipchart

The role of the instructor is very important – as an organisation ambassador, a facilitator and a role model. You are responsible for creating the conditions for good learning to take place, within the given framework.

**Know your participants:**
- What skills, motivation and experience do they have?
- Your teaching must be adapted in form and content to the participants as this often varies from course to course and between different course implementations
Method is about how you teach to achieve the learning objectives and which resources you use; it should be characterised by involvement, practice, reflection and interaction.

You can make evaluations before, during and after the training to develop and adapt the course content and teaching styles. Is there anything you want to change for the next session?

WELCOME AND SETTING THE SCENE

- Registration of participants
- Introduction:
  - The facilitators introduce themselves
  - Briefly describe your background
  - Present practicalities such as available facilities, fire safety etc.
- Daily agenda – a brief introduction to the training and its objectives

TIP The introduction of participants can be skipped if the group already know each other.

ACTIVITY 1: EXPECTATIONS AND AIMS

Ask the participants to introduce themselves and to mention what they hope to gain from this workshop. The expectations are written down on a flipchart or a whiteboard for the group to re-visit in session 6.

Spend two or three minutes going through the objectives of the training:

- To equip ambulance providers with simple practical skills to improve their security and mitigate the impact of violence
- To offer a starting point for organisations providing ambulance services who seek to review and reinforce their existing preparedness and security management

BASICS RULES OF THE WORKING AGREEMENT

- The working agreement is a set of rules that members of the workshop develop together and commit to. Ask the participants: What rules do we need in order to create a safe environment where everybody can learn comfortably and actively?
- Write down the suggested rules on a flipchart or projected on a screen so that everyone can read them and suggest adaptations where necessary. Display the list of basic rules where everyone can see it clearly during the workshop

The introduction of participants can be skipped if the group already know each other.

TIP For help managing difficult reactions and disclosures in the group, see Training in Psychological First Aid – Support to Teams p. 64.

Examples of useful considerations for the group:

- Create a safe environment and decide together to maintain confidentiality
- Consider following the Chatham House Rule, whereby you can share information but never reveal the source, to create a trusted environment for discussing potentially sensitive issues
- Be mindful of each other and be constructive in your comments
- Everybody is invited to share their point of view, but nobody should be pressured to speak
- Make sure that all the participants have equal chances to speak and express themselves
- Personal concerns and boundaries should be respected
- Remember that this workshop is not to assess your competence as professionals, but to gain additional skills
- Participate and listen actively
- Encourage questions
- Turn off phones or have them face down on the table as a commitment to being present in the session
- Leave the room to make or receive calls if they are necessary
- Be on time for the sessions

Emphasise the importance of understanding and accepting that everyone is different and has different experiences. This room should be a safe place, and if someone, for whatever reason, needs to leave the room, they should feel free to do so.

See page 137 for a list of resources and further reading for this session

12 tinyurl.com/329vr58h | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org)
SESSION 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST AMBULANCE PROVIDERS

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session the participants will:

• have an understanding of what violence against healthcare is and how it affects ambulance providers
• have reflected on the impact of violence on ambulance providers and any potential gaps in their current response

SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the training</td>
<td>Presentation of the rationale for this session and how it’s relevant to participants’ contexts</td>
<td>15 mins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1: Violence against ambulance providers | • Facilitator-led discussion on the issue of violence  
• Group work to map threats and violent incidents  
• Categorising violent incidents (group presentations) | 1 hour |
| 2. Different perceptions Why does violence happen? | • Plenary discussion to consolidate different perceptions among ambulance providers, patient, relatives, etc  
• Individual and group work to develop understanding of our perceptions, and look at why threats and violence arise | 1 hour |
| 3: Impact of violence | • Group work on discussing the consequences of violence and its impact on ambulance providers  
• Plenary presentations from each group | 30 mins |
| 4: Wrap-up Common understanding of violence against ambulance providers | Short summary from the facilitator and participants in the plenary | 15 mins |

PROPOSED SESSION TIME

3 HOURS
PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR:

- Make a plan for this session
- Familiarise yourself with part 1 of the training manual, with particular focus on the ‘Healthcare in Danger’ chapter, p.14–17. Acquaint yourself with the additional resources highlighted in the boxes
- Find information on how threats and violence are defined by your organisation. If available, please obtain your organisation’s SOP
- Pinpoint what the threshold of acceptable risk is for the organisation (p. 32–33 in part 1)
- Perform a basic desktop review of common incidents of threats and violence against ambulance providers that may occur in your context
- Obtain information about the national laws on the provision of ambulance services (pages 18–26 in part 1)
  - Who are ambulance providers? How have we defined these for the purpose of this session? What types are there in their context and around the world?
  - Who is entitled to provide ambulance and pre-hospital services?
  - What are the rights and obligations of ambulance providers?
  - How are they identified?
  - What sanctions exist for the acts of violence against ambulance providers?
- Review if there are any specific regulations at the level of the employer/organisation
  - Are there any institutions or organisations collecting data on violence against healthcare, including ambulance providers, at a national level?
- If available, and with the consent of management, obtain information from the organisation on reported incidents of threats and violence

INTRODUCTION TO THIS SESSION

The facilitator informs the participants that this session aims to build on the awareness of violence against ambulance providers acquired through part 1. It should deepen our understanding of how threats and violence affect us as professionals and the impact this may have on us and our work.

Through the exercises, the participants will gain a better understanding of the types of abuse, verbal or physical, that often occur in their context. What are the potential gaps in their current response and how can they better prepare to respond to this violence?

The mapping of incidents of violence will be useful for the risk matrix activity in section 2 (‘Managing the risks’).

The facilitator goes through the session outline.

ACTIVITY 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST AMBULANCE PROVIDERS

Main issues to be highlighted: One is not alone in having experienced threats and violence. The reasons behind such acts vary greatly.

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic based on information provided in part 1 related to this topic, and the information below.

DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The World Health Organization (WHO)</th>
<th>tinyurl.com/2p879hvky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC)</th>
<th>tinyurl.com/1ad464pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>According to the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), the basis of any violence is “the use of force or power, either as an action or omission in any setting, threatened, perceived or actual against oneself, another person, a group, a community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in death, physical injury, psychological or emotional harm, mal-development or deprivation.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workplace violence is violence associated with work. It can include physical and/or psychological violence that occurs in the ambulance station or offices, in the ambulance itself, at a healthcare facility or the incident location.
A pilot study of workplace violence toward paramedics

An academic study to identify the percentage of paramedics who have experienced six different forms of violence in the workplace.

tinyurl.com/2bkw5nfu

Violence against ambulance providers is usually not an isolated, individual problem, but a structural, strategic problem embedded in economic, social, organisational and cultural factors. Recognising risks is important in order to determine appropriate courses of action before incidents occur. It is also important to distinguish between the origins of the violence. These may include: interpersonal aggression, perhaps family members or neighbours attacking ambulance providers; a sense of frustration within communities; organised violence (such as gang-related violence); being caught up in armed conflict; being in situations where ambulance providers are specifically targeted.

Obstructions are also an example of violence. Retaining ambulances at checkpoints or roadblocks with a critical patient waiting to be transferred is a violent act according to WHO’s definition, and also gravely traumatising to the team.

Physical violence in the ambulance and pre-hospital service is widely acknowledged, while psychological violence is underestimated. Psychological violence is often perpetrated through relatively small, repeated behaviours which cumulatively become a significant form of violence. Although a single incident may be sufficient, it is often these repeated, unwelcome and imposed actions that can have a devastating effect on the health professional. Psychological violence should also be a priority concern in the workplace.

Definition of psychological violence: any intentional conduct that seriously impairs another person’s psychological wellbeing through coercion or threats.

Plenary discussion: The facilitator leads a plenary reflection on how threats and violence are understood.

Emphasise the importance of understanding and accepting that everyone is different and has different experiences. Exposure to threats and violence can be difficult to talk about or even think about. For that reason, if someone does not want to talk, wants to leave the room or needs a private conversation, they should be given the opportunity along with the assurance that this is okay. Also remind the participants they should only share experiences they are comfortable discussing.

Participants are asked to raise their hands if they:

• Have ever felt unsafe while providing medical assistance
• Have ever experienced threats or been verbally abused at work or when providing medical assistance
• Have ever been physically attacked while giving medical assistance
• Have ever been prevented from performing their duties by third parties

The facilitator then may choose to ask some of the below questions to the group as a whole or ask participants to volunteer to share their experience.

Suggested questions to help the discussion:

• What were the circumstances of the incident that took place?
• Who were the perpetrators?
• Do you believe it was intentional or unintentional? Why?
• Has your ambulance ever been denied access to those that needed assistance? If yes, why?
• What factors can increase the risk of exposure to violence? (age, sex, ethnicity, religion, experience)

13 tinyurl.com/14yw4uv
14 tinyurl.com/14yw4uv
15 tinyurl.com/54ayb2z | European Institute for Gender Equality (europa.eu)
• Statement for discussion: women experience higher levels of verbal aggression and sexual abuse, while men experience more overt threats and physical assaults. Does it matter if you are a male or female ambulance provider?

**Group Work:** The participants are divided into small groups and asked to consolidate any threats and violence they have experienced, witnessed or heard of. They can use post-it notes to write them down. This is to focus attention and increase understanding of what threats and violence are.

One person from each group will place the post-its under the following categories on a flipchart or equivalent, marked with ‘psychological harm’, ‘physical bodily harm’ and ‘material damage’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological Harm</th>
<th>Physical Harm</th>
<th>Material Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>Examples:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Threats: verbal</td>
<td>- Attacks/assaults</td>
<td>- Hitting or kicking a wall, door or other physical object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or non-verbal</td>
<td>- Blockages of the work of the ambulance team</td>
<td>- Throwing things around to scare or in anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. sexual,</td>
<td>- Incidents which cause major injury</td>
<td>- Attacks to the ambulance or the ambulance interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abusive,</td>
<td>- Incidents which require medical assistance or first aid</td>
<td>- Stealing the ambulance or ambulance equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threatening</td>
<td>- Sexual assaults</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behaviour)</td>
<td>- Homicide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ganging up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Harassment/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persecution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calls, letters)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Stalking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intimidation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bullying</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Each group will have five minutes to present their work.

The facilitator should end the exercise by commenting on the results, including whether verbal or physical violence seems the greater threat for these participants. The facilitator could ask the participants which types of violence have the greatest impact on them personally and how that might affect their work environment. We recommend that if this triggers discomfort or heavy feelings, that should not be interpreted as a problem and the facilitator should invite participants to seek support.

**TIP** Managing difficult reactions and disclosures in the group. Visit Training in Psychological First Aid – Support to Teams p64\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) tinyurl.com/32hvr58 | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org)

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**PART 2 – SESSION 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST AMBULANCE PROVIDERS**

**In their own words: from an ambulance provider**

**FIGHT BETWEEN TWO GROUPS**

**The Incident**

One night, we responded to a call from a dangerous location where the local police need to keep watch. A fight broke out in the neighbourhood, with knives involved and several casualties.

When we got there, the police were nowhere to be found. One casualty was in a critical condition, with a knife in his back, so the team immediately headed to him.

The area was not safe and two groups were still fighting. Our focus was on the most critically injured, which upset one of the two groups. They accused us of not being impartial and pushed members of the team, which restarted the fight.

The situation was chaotic. The driver of the ambulance called the police, but there was no of them. We decided to treat the casualty inside the ambulance and evacuate quickly.

People started to block the road in front of our ambulance, demanding that we take all the casualties, which wasn’t possible. We were now unable to drive the ambulance though we wouldn’t be able to leave safely and get to hospital.

Just as the people outside began to open the door of the ambulance, the police car finally appeared and gave us chance to leave. We stopped away from the scene and treated the casualty, who had lost a significant amount of blood. Then we finally headed for the hospital.

**Analysis**

We completed the operation successfully and the casualty was transported to hospital after receiving emergency care. But, to be honest, we were lucky. We were on the verge of a disaster caused by a lack of awareness about the principle of impartiality. People need to know about this principle and its role in our work.

Another mistake was not confirming that police had arrived. This almost caused more injuries. Interfering in a struggle between two groups requires intense focus, local knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the incident, and a handle on security measures.

We were lucky that the police showed up, albeit late, and we may not be so lucky next time. In the future, we need to confirm we have accurate and sufficient information from dispatch. We also need to implement stronger security measures, to help de-escalate potentially violent situations.

As a medical officer, I am surprised that society has so little awareness that all those enrolled in the Red Cross and Red Crescent are volunteers and impartial, that we do not distinguish between victims, and that our goal is simply to preserve life and dignity. We need to raise awareness to prevent people from blocking ambulances and stopping us from doing our work.
**ACTIVITY 2: DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS**

**Main issue to be highlighted:** One can consciously focus one’s attention, and thus influence what information the brain will absorb, but since our consciousness is affected by emotions, experiences and unconscious processes, we must first become aware of these.

**Introduction:** The facilitator introduces the activity by linking the previous discussion to the information below.

By being aware of how we and others see a situation, we may be better equipped to de-escalate that situation. Everyone interprets events differently based on experience, knowledge and intuition.

Much of our interpretation happens without us thinking about it. We do not think we interpret signals when we see a traffic sign, a police officer or an ambulance. Most of the information the brain receives goes straight into the unconscious, so our behaviour is often affected by things we aren’t aware of.

Perception is about how we experience the world through our five senses – sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch – and can be understood through three sub-processes:

- Sensation
- Interpretation
- Behaviour

From the moment we get up to the moment we go to bed, we are constantly busy with three things:

- Receiving external stimuli
- Thinking and comparing external stimuli with the information stored in our own brain
- Drawing conclusions, making decisions or taking action

Perception involves two steps:

1. That one or more sensory organs are stimulated
2. That this stimulation is interpreted and results in an experience

The second step depends on our own assumptions and expectations. Perception is our recognition of physical objects or social situations based on our individual sensory impressions here and now. It is fair to say that perception is very subjective.

**Plenary discussion:** The facilitator shows three pictures, one at a time. The participants are asked to share what they see.

It is the totality of the image that makes sense to us, not only the individual elements. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

**Pair discussion:** The facilitator invites participants to sit in silence for one minute and think of a work experience containing threats or violence where the situation turned out to be very different from what they had first thought, in a positive or negative way.

After one minute the facilitator asks the participants to turn to the person next to them and describe the situation they were thinking of. Discuss the below question:

- Could you have done anything different in this particular situation to change the outcome (positive or negative)?

**Group work:** The facilitator divides the participants into groups of three or four people and asks them to discuss the following question:

- Are there any contexts that might trigger feelings of insecurity or fear? If so, why?

After 10 minutes, the facilitator asks the groups to list the different threats associated with various contexts. They must also try to explain why they believe that the perpetrators might be acting in such frightening ways. The more examples given, the better. The goal is for the participants to reflect on different perspectives and perceptions. One designated person from each group writes down their main findings on a flipchart.

Suggested questions to help the discussion:

- Who are the perpetrators?
- What can be the motivations or reasons for perpetrated threat or attack?
- What are the circumstances?
- How are the ambulance services perceived by these people?
- Have there been previous incidents?

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17. perspsjon – Store norske leksikon (snl.no)
The facilitator refers to the images below to make the point that the angle from which we see things, from which position we perceive a situation, can determine how the experience is understood.

ACTIVITY 3: IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Main issue to be highlighted: Threats and violence have an impact on us as ambulance providers and our organisation more generally and should therefore not be accepted as just ‘part of the job’

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic.

Group work: The facilitator divides the participants into groups of three or four and asks them to discuss the impact violence has on ambulance providers. Participants should reflect on:
- How violence impacts them as healthcare providers, both in the short and long term
- Why threats and violence should not be accepted as just ‘part of the job’

Plenary discussion: Each group reports back in the plenary and a consolidated list is developed and kept as a resource by the facilitator to contextualise other activities in the coming sessions.

DEALING WITH VIOLENCE BY NON-PHYSICAL MEANS

The incident
Based on the below information, we dispatched to the call. We had just dealt with a similar call, so we were quite relaxed and not expecting anything extraordinary. The fact that ‘community patrol’ was on-scene and had requested an ambulance also suggested there was little reason for concern.

Time: ~02.30 am
Week day: Weekend
Location: Main Road
Dispatch call: “Alcohol intoxication, drunk, community patrol requests ambulance”
Type of call: “Urgent” (speed lights and siren)
Drive time: 4 minutes (to given address)
Shift: 23:00 – 07:00
Team: 2 personnel – 1 x EMT1 (medic) + 1 x EMT2 (senior medic/driver)
Previous call: “Suspected alcohol intake, fatigue, blurry vision”

While driving on the main road, we saw the orange flashing lights of community patrol, as well as blue police lights (missed clue #1).

When we got there, we saw one vehicle had driven into the back of another at a red light. A policeman told us only one person needed assistance – the driver of the vehicle that had collided with the stationary car.

A quick visual assessment of occupants from the other vehicles verified that there were no other injuries. The policeman who briefed us said that the driver was “totally drunk”, “smells of alcohol” and “was walking around cursing before he noticed the police, then got back into the driver’s seat to sleep” (missed clue #2).

The driver did not react to his name but did react to pain which was met with slurred curses. We transferred the driver to the ambulance to check vitals since there were no visual injuries. The driver was clearly bothered by the ambulance team’s attention and said he wanted to sleep.

In their own words: from an ambulance provider

DEALING WITH VIOLENCE BY NON-PHYSICAL MEANS

The incident
Based on the below information, we dispatched to the call. We had just dealt with a similar call, so we were quite relaxed and not expecting anything extraordinary. The fact that ‘community patrol’ was on-scene and had requested an ambulance also suggested there was little reason for concern.

Time: ~02.30 am
Week day: Weekend
Location: Main Road
Dispatch call: “Alcohol intoxication, drunk, community patrol requests ambulance”
Type of call: “Urgent” (speed lights and siren)
Drive time: 4 minutes (to given address)
Shift: 23:00 – 07:00
Team: 2 personnel – 1 x EMT1 (medic) + 1 x EMT2 (senior medic/driver)
Previous call: “Suspected alcohol intake, fatigue, blurry vision”

While driving on the main road, we saw the orange flashing lights of community patrol, as well as blue police lights (missed clue #1).

When we got there, we saw one vehicle had driven into the back of another at a red light. A policeman told us only one person needed assistance – the driver of the vehicle that had collided with the stationary car.

A quick visual assessment of occupants from the other vehicles verified that there were no other injuries. The policeman who briefed us said that the driver was “totally drunk”, “smells of alcohol” and “was walking around cursing before he noticed the police, then got back into the driver’s seat to sleep” (missed clue #2).

The driver did not react to his name but did react to pain which was met with slurred curses. We transferred the driver to the ambulance to check vitals since there were no visual injuries. The driver was clearly bothered by the ambulance team’s attention and said he wanted to sleep.

18 tinyurl.com/2bkw5n6i (researchgate.net)
Since the police suspected drunk-driving, a policeman was to escort us and the driver in the ambulance to the hospital. When the driver saw the policeman, he got violent, lashed out and tried to leave.

We managed to restrain the driver without sustaining any blows or injuries by pinning him down on the stretcher with our weight. We explained the consequences of attacking a policeman and ambulance team member. The driver agreed not to be violent so we didn't use handcuffs or triangular bandages. The drive to the hospital passed without further incident.

**Analysis**

Anyone who has ever dealt with security or safety issues knows to be wary of thinking a situation is ‘routine’.

Seek information. If anything doesn't make sense, no matter how seemingly insignificant, probe it. We are all aware that there are communication gaps between callers, dispatchers and emergency teams: the information can be misinterpreted, forgotten, misrepresented.

While many emergency calls might follow a type of pattern, every call has the potential to develop into something totally unexpected. I feel that the drunk call we attended before this one dulled our senses.

Reassess all the time. Once we saw the blue police lights, we should have connected the dots and realised there was a drunk driver. Had my partner or I reassessed or voiced this idea, I am quite sure we would have been more alert and ready for potential dangers.

What if? In this case, had I asked myself, “What if the drunken driver is not asleep?”, a lot of the drama might have been avoided. I have no doubt that the policeman who briefed our team was convinced that the driver really was asleep, but we did not question it and we should have. The driver was drowsy-drunk but definitely not asleep. He was trying to avoid police questioning by pretending to be asleep (missed clue #2).

Minimise confrontation. I am fairly convinced that the drama that ensued might have been avoided if both the policeman and ambulance crew had been trained to try and keep confrontation to a minimum.

**Moral dilemmas**

Judgement: I found myself judging the driver for drunken driving (unverified, of course, at the time of interaction), but also for being a serious threat to others. It would be dishonest to say that I didn't judge him and I remember thinking that I was glad that the police were on-scene to deal with it. I had to be conscious that I had to represent my organisation honourably and act appropriately.

Anger: When the driver turned violent, I had flashes of this person hurting my children. I felt anger building, even though I didn't act it out.

"THERE IS NO ONE RIGHT ANSWER AND ONLY THROUGH DISCUSSION, DEBATE AND LISTENING TO THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHERS CAN ONE ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE."

**Lessons learned**

I am fairly convinced that the drama that ensued might have been avoided if both the policeman and ambulance crew had been trained to try and keep confrontation to a minimum.

In this particular case, since the drunk driver was relatively drowsy, it would have been wiser that the policeman either sat next to the driver or in the paramedic seat after getting into the ambulance via the ambulance’s side door, thus avoiding eye contact and full-frontal presence.

I often play through different scenarios of the same incident and wonder how I could better manage future incidents. There is no one right answer and only through discussion, debate and listening to the experiences of others can one adequately prepare for incidents of this nature. I very situation – the circumstances and events, the organisations and populations – is different and you have to be confident in your approach, your organisation and your support mechanisms. This is definitely a topic for discussion which I did not receive during my training.
WRAP-UP

Plenary discussion: The facilitator asks the participants to summarise the main takeaways from this session and provide an opportunity for the participants to jointly reflect on what they have learned. A wrap-up can be done in several ways, and one suggestion is simply: What did I learn today?  

Purpose

- Evaluation
- Summing up

TIP Make sure everyone has one minute to think. Some finish quickly and others need more time.

How

Participants sit in a circle. Give each participant the task of expressing with one sentence what they have learned from session 1. They are given one minute to think and put together a sentence, and then they share it with the group. For example: "I have learned that the way things look to me can be very different to another person’s perspective."

See page 140 for a list of resources and further reading for this session.

SESSION 2: USING RISK METHODOLOGY

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session the participants will:

- have knowledge of the key elements of risk management
- have considered how these can be applied to ambulance and pre-hospital services
- thought about how these may be relevant to their own organisation
- have identified the risks in their practice and how these might be managed
- recognise how important it is to report incidents, and know the key elements that should be reported

SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the training</td>
<td>Presentation of the rationale for this session and how it's relevant to participants’ contexts</td>
<td>15 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Familiarising with the concepts of risk</td>
<td>Group work followed by a plenary discussion</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Managing the risks</td>
<td>- Facilitator presentation</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Group work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Matrix - the already defined list of threats and violence from the previous session will be placed in the matrix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Incident reporting</td>
<td>Facilitator presentation followed by plenary discussions and discussions in pairs</td>
<td>45 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Reporting template</td>
<td>- Group work</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Plenary discussions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrap-up</td>
<td>Short summary from the facilitator and participants in the plenary</td>
<td>15 mins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROPOSED SESSION TIME

3 HOURS 45 MINS
PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR

- Ensure that management are aware of the topics that will be discussed and that they welcome the initiative; it is important to have their support and for participants to know they can speak freely
- Make a plan for this session
- Familiarise yourself with the section on the risk management approach (pages 28–37 of part 1)
- If available, become acquainted with the organisation’s risk management plan related to violence against ambulance providers, and make it accessible to the participants
- Familiarise yourself with the organisation’s risk assessment matrix, if there is one, and use this as a basis for further work in this session
- Prepare handouts of the risk matrix for activity 2
- Familiarise yourself with the organisation’s incident reporting system and prepare handouts of procedure(s) if available

INTRODUCTION TO THIS SECTION

The facilitator explains that this session provides practical tools to support the risk management approach for assessing and mitigating risks associated with the delivery of healthcare, as well as an exercise to practise risk assessment. The session will also highlight the importance of incident reporting and risk register.

Useful reading material for participants. For full text see annexes 1 (page 153), 2 (page 159) and 3 (page 161)

- The ‘Procedure for conducting a risk assessment for ambulance and pre-hospital services’ describes each step of a risk assessment
- The ‘Example of a risk-assessment protocol’ provides suggestions of how to make a risk assessment in an organisation
- The ‘Example of a risk mitigation measure’ illustrates how to reduce the impact or the likelihood of incidents once an assessment has been made. The example used includes the presence of manned checkpoints

**TIP** We are all responsible for making risk assessments, and we all do it in our daily lives, even if we do not always notice it.

**ACTIVITY 1: FAMILIARISING WITH THE CONCEPTS OF RISK**

**Main issue to be highlighted:** The difference between personal and organisational risk. Everyone in the organisation has some degree of responsibility in identifying and managing risks.

**INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS RISK?**

Ambulance and pre-hospital healthcare take place in environments where there are many unknowns and where it is not possible to control all the elements, so we must undertake dynamic risk assessments regularly when attending incidents. This means constant assessment and reassessment of the risks to ourselves, the patient and others. These risks may be related to the treatment being provided, but more often they are related to the surrounding environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk management: guidelines</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISO 31000: Guidelines, principles, framework and a process for managing risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tinyurl.com/uusddn9z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IN THEIR OWN WORDS: FROM AN AMBULANCE PROVIDER**

**UNSAFE FIELD WORK**

**The incident**

Before this field mission, we’d been in contact with local authorities and had their approval to be there. When we parked up two men with weapons appeared and began shouting at us. They asked who we were and who had told us there were mines in the area, and said that we were suspicious. They told us they had to check all the cars, including the ambulance. I explained that we are humanitarian workers and as medical staff we only had medical equipment on board. One of us could understand the local language, which was lucky: the armed men were talking about killing us and stealing our things. When we heard that, we shared the information with the team and left the area. That same day, other humanitarian workers
were attacked and one person was killed. There was no government or police force nearby. The area was declared unsafe, humanitarian operations were stopped and we had to move to another region where working conditions were more stable.

**Analysis**

This happened because we were not in contact with all the various armed groups. This contact should have been maintained through local authorities, to raise awareness among those various groups and among the general population so that they know we are an impartial, neutral and humanitarian organisation. All this requires transparency, trust and clear communication systems. A strong safety assessment must be introduced, and security training is necessary too.

**Who is responsible?**

Part of the ambulance providers’ service is to identify and manage risks, including wider organisational risks. The formal responsibility for risk management usually sits with the leadership team, but everyone within an organisation has some degree of responsibility for identifying and reporting risks, as well as dealing with them in an operational context.

**Group work:** The participants are divided into groups. Depending on the number of participants, decide whether each group should answer all the questions or share the questions between the groups.

• What is risk?
• What might be examples of risks in your work context?
• How do you see your responsibility in identifying and managing risks?
• Which risks are acceptable to you, and which are not?
• Which risks are acceptable in your organisation, and which are not?
• What do you think are the biggest risks for ambulance providers in your context?

**Plenary discussion:** Following group discussions, the facilitator asks the participants to share with the whole group some of the risks they have discussed and how they might manage them as a team.

**Presentation of terms and concepts. Opportunity to discuss if required:**

- **Hazard** – anything with the potential to cause harm
- **Risk** – the likelihood that a hazard will cause harm
- **Risk management** – a system for identification, reduction and, where possible, elimination of risks
- **Risk appetite** – amount of risk that an individual or organisation is willing to accept or be exposed to at a given time
- **Risk identification** – any means by which a risk is recognised and this information is passed to an appropriate person
- **Residual risk** – level of risk deemed acceptable after risk reduction measures have been applied
- **Risk register** – the system used to record risks that have been identified, their rating score and what measures have been applied

**ACTIVITY 2: MANAGING THE RISKS**

**Main issue to be highlighted:** The purpose is to gain insight and knowledge about the risk assessment matrix and its use.

**Important!** The results of the exercise must not be considered the actual risk assessment of the organisation as this needs to be led and approved by operational management.

**Facilitator presentation:** The facilitator presents the ‘Procedure for conducting a risk assessment for ambulance providers’ (p.157 in annex 1) with particular focus on points 5 and 6.

You will find additional resources and examples when preparing for this session in ‘Example of risk-assessment protocol’ (p. 159 in annex 2) and ‘Example of a risk mitigation measure’ (p. 161 in annex 3).

**Group work:** The facilitator asks the participants to provide a relevant risk using the list of threats and violence developed in session 1 (‘Violence against ambulance providers’) as a reference.

The facilitator then asks the participants to get into small groups and provides them with handouts of the risk matrix (annex 6, p. 174). Each participant should first reflect on how they would score the risk and discuss this within their group. The facilitator should guide the participants step by step, giving them instructions on how to use the risk assessment matrix. Participants should be able to ask questions at any point throughout this process.
ASSESSING THE RISK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK TO AMBULANCE PROVIDERS</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Risk assessment matrix

Step 1: The participant should identify criteria to define each level of severity and come up with indicators. Refer to point 5 of the 'Procedure for conducting a risk assessment for ambulance providers' (p. 153 in annex 1).

Step 2: Based on the previous exercise, the participant should in their context identify which hazards are the most relevant for them as ambulance providers.

Step 3: The participant should assess the potential severity and likelihood of the hazard causing harm. They should then plot each hazard into the risk assessment matrix (figure 9). In assessing the severity of an incident, participants will need to refer to the criteria defining each level of severity and the agreed upon indicators. In assessing the likelihood, participants will need to consider the elements provided in point 6 of the 'Procedure for conducting a risk assessment for ambulance providers' (p. 155 in annex 1).

Plenary discussion: The facilitator asks for volunteers to share their risk assessment, plotting them on a common matrix (either projected or drawn on a flipchart). They are also encouraged to explain how they came to these conclusions by making reference to criteria, indicators, likelihood and severity.

Participants are likely to have different results, which can generate interesting discussions and reflections. However, the facilitator should wrap the exercise up with the remark that it is the process itself that is the focus here, not finding the correct place to plot a hazard. That would require more dedicated time, a wider consultation and the direct involvement of operational management. Any general consensus around risks and where in the matrix they belong could be of interest to management and should, if the group agrees, be shared along with the takeaways collected throughout the workshop.

The facilitator should also point out the importance of understanding the motives behind perpetrator actions when trying to determine mitigating measures.

Assessing risks that may impede the safe delivery of healthcare is a continuous process and should be regularly renewed. Defining the appropriate frequency of new assessments is the role of the organisation’s management.

ACTIVITY 3: INCIDENT REPORTING

Main issue to be highlighted: It is important to have an updated understanding of risks and incident reporting as an important tool in this regard.

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic based on the information below, then makes reference to the previous activity that has provided an understanding of the contextual risks. Participants are asked whether this picture will be relevant next week, next month and next year.

Incident reporting is not about getting people into trouble. It is an essential tool for identifying and reducing the risks of recurring incidents.

Security incidents can occur at any time and in any work environment. Ambulance providers operating in unsafe environments and in crisis situations may be at risk of experiencing a security incident. Research shows that violence against healthcare workers is “an underreported, ubiquitous, and persistent problem that has been tolerated and largely ignored”\(^ {21}\). Established procedures for reporting and monitoring security episodes should be in place and well known to all ambulance providers, and mechanisms for responding to such cases must be available. All incidents should be reported, including threats, violence or crime that can have lasting physical and emotional effects on everyone involved. Each organisation has a duty to protect, respond and support its employees before, during and after an incident occurs\(^ {22}\).

20 Remember: an incident includes those hazardous events that could have caused harm as well as those which did cause harm.

21 tinyurl.com/4xk9e9nc

22 tinyurl.com/2p9ne6xh
There are periodic reviews of such incident reports to help improve safety measures in the workplace. This responsibility usually lies with organisational management rather than providers.

ISO standards: Recording and reporting – see section 6.7

**THE IMPORTANCE OF REPORTING AND MONITORING SECURITY INCIDENTS**

Insight into the situations where ambulance providers can be exposed to threats and violence requires a reporting system. Management will then receive information on which areas require increased competence and/or implement measures to reduce or eliminate the risk. Violence of any kind is not acceptable and your organisation can only act if they know about the incidents. There must be a culture in the organisation that promotes incident reporting without fear of reprisals or criticism.

**Pair discussion:** Participants are asked to turn to the person sitting next to them and discuss the following two topics:
1) The importance of reporting and monitoring incidents with reference to ambulance providers and pre-hospital context
2) The different types of threats and violence to be reported, using examples

**Safety and Security Incident Information Management (SIIM) for Staff**

A resource explaining how to report a safety and security incident to your organisation.

What is a near miss?

OSHA definition of a near miss “in which a worker might have been hurt if the circumstances had been slightly different.”

**ACTIVITY 4: REPORTING TEMPLATE**

Main issue to be highlighted: There are different reporting systems and routines, and each organisation must determine which is the best and most effective for itself and its employees. If reporting systems are in place, there should be “clear guidelines on how to report an incident and set expectations on how they will use the information in the report to take next steps”.

**Preventing and protecting against attacks**

An article addressing the work carried out by the WHO to prevent attacks on health care.

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23 tinyurl.com/xywzbd | Ilo.org

24 tinyurl.com/2p9ne6xh | Mobile_Guide_MOBILEGUIDE_SIIM_Staff.pdf (insecurityinsight.org) p.6
WHO: Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA)
A tool collecting and sharing data about incidents of attacks in emergency countries.

tinyurl.com/yc6c6bnj

Option 1:
FOR PARTICIPANTS FROM ORGANISATIONS WITH WELL-FUNCTIONING REPORTING SYSTEMS IN PLACE

Group work: With management’s approval, the facilitator distributes the organisation’s existing reporting procedures. In small groups, the participants go through the procedures and discuss the content. The following questions can be used as a starting point:

• Is the system easy to use and easily accessible?
• Have you been taught how to use the reporting system?
• Do you use the system?
• If you are not using it, what might encourage you to?
• Are there any elements you would add to the reporting system?
• How might you be better at reporting security incidents involving threats and violence?
• Do you trust how the system is managing sensitive information and the routines for ensuring data protection?

Personal data may be considered ‘sensitive’ and subject to specific processing conditions.

Which personal data is considered sensitive?

An official European Union checklist of data considered sensitive, which is subject to specific processing conditions.

tinyurl.com/yc6c6bnj

Option 2:
THIS SECTION IS MAINLY RELEVANT FOR ORGANISATIONS THAT SO FAR HAVE NO OR LIMITED INCIDENT REPORTING PROCEDURES AND TEMPLATES IN PLACE

Group work: The facilitator divides the participants into small groups and presents or hands out examples of reporting templates.

An example of how to design a reporting template: The Health Care in Danger ‘Guiding note on incident reporting for health care providers’ can be found on p.165 in annex 4.

TIP Give the participants the opportunity to look at the checklist on p. 6 in Safety and Security Incident Information Management (SIIM) for Staff.

For a resource explaining how to report a safety and security incident to your organisation, see QR code on page 66.

Discuss and write down what the reporting template for your organisation should contain. Reflect on why it should or should not include certain information. Important aspects to consider may include:

• Place, date, time of the incident
• Details of victim. Who was involved?

25 tinyurl.com/7kc47kg | Health Care in Danger - The responsibilities of health-care personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies (healthcareindanger.org)
Circumstances around the incident. What happened?
Consequences (injuries, sick leave, termination of work, etc.)
Information on measures. What actions have been taken up to now?

Highlight: Reporting mechanisms should not become police documents, otherwise the link between ambulances and security services can cause perception issues for the ambulance providers and the pre-hospital services.

In addition to creating a reporting template for later completion, it is important to report on:
• Lessons identified/learned
• Suggestions to prevent a similar incident from happening

TIP Remember only to include relevant information. This helps reduce the risk of details being misused later.

Continue in the same groups and now discuss:
• How long should the template be?
• When to report: immediately or later?
• Who should do the reporting?
• Who is collecting the information?
• What is going to be done with the information?
  • Educational tools
  • Analysed data (e.g. to identify trends that help to formulate injury reduction)
• What happens to the report once it is submitted?
• If I provide my contact information, how will it be used?
• Do I have to give my name when I submit a report?
• How is my identity protected when I submit a report?
• How is the confidentiality of the report going to be sustained?

Plenary discussion: The facilitator asks each group to present their responses, followed by a plenary discussion. The outcome should be a consolidated list of agreed-upon recommendations that can be presented to the operational management.

WRAP-UP

Plenary discussion: The facilitator asks the participants to summarise the main takeaways from this session and write them down to bring to session 6. This provides an opportunity for the participants to jointly reflect on what they have learned.

A wrap-up can be done in several ways, and one suggestion is the ‘cabbage ball’ activity.

TIP If IP&C is a concern, each may be given a question singly.

Purpose
• Evaluation
• Summing up

Preparations for the facilitator
• Count the number of participants. You are recommended to prepare one review question for each participant
• Refer to the topic and main learning points to create your questions
• Write a single review question on each piece of paper
• Crumple the paper into a ball
• Write a new single question on a single sheet of paper. Cover the first crumpled ball with this second paper
• Continue writing one review question on a new sheet of paper each time
• Add each sheet to the ball
• When you have finished, you will have a small ball or ‘cabbage’ with layers of questions

How
• Ask participants to stand and form a circle
• Gently toss the cabbage ball to a participant
• Ask the participant to peel the top sheet from the cabbage ball and read the question out loud. If the participant can answer the question, they should do so. If the participant is not able to answer the question, they can ask the group
• Once the question is answered, ask the participant to toss the cabbage ball to a new participant who has not yet answered a question. The participant receiving the cabbage ball will peel off the top sheet, read the question out loud, and answer it to the best of their ability
• Continue until all review questions have been answered
• Congratulate everyone for their participation and round off the session

See page 142 for a list of resources and further reading for this session.
SESSION 3: SECURITY AND BEHAVIOUR

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session the participants will:

• understand how a code of conduct can help improve perception, acceptance, security and access for ambulance providers
• understand how identification and uniforms can improve security
• know the principles of safe communication
• know how to improve situational awareness
• understand how cultural, religious and traditional norms can influence attitudes towards ambulance providers and healthcare in general

SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the training</td>
<td>Present the thinking behind this session, how it’s relevant and how the participants will be involved</td>
<td>15 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Safer Access Framework (SAF)</td>
<td>A plenary discussion on how our behaviour can affect each element of the SAF-cycle</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Behaviour and Code of Conduct (CoC)</td>
<td>- Discussion on what the ideal CoC is</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Look at how the CoC would mitigate the risks identified in previous sessions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Group work to review the organisation’s CoC and the actual practices</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Groups present recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: Uniforms and other means of identification</td>
<td>- Case discussion in pairs and feedback in the plenary</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Group discussion on the uniform(s) used by the participants’ service</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Sharing of findings in the plenary</td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Who are we communicating with?</td>
<td>- Discuss experiences of poor and effective communications</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
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<td>- Individual exercise</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Plenary discussion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Collection of final recommendations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **5: Situational awareness** | - Plenary exercise: video  
- Presentation about being in a risk situation  
- Individual exercise on awareness  
- Facilitator presents the topic and gives information for the outdoor exercise  
- Plenary discussion on being aware of surroundings  
- Wrap-up | 2 hours |
| **6: Culture, Religion, Tradition (CRT)** | - The facilitator frames the discussion  
- Role-play  
- Plenary exercise with the observers presenting what they witnessed  
- Discussion on CRT competence  
- Recommendations | 1 hour |
| **7: Takeaways** | Plenary consolidation | 45 mins |
| **8: Wrap-up** | | 10 mins |

### PROPOSED SESSION TIME

8 HOURS 35 MINS

### PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR:

- Make a plan/agenda for this session
- Familiarise yourself again with the risks, gaps and needs collected during sessions 1 and 2
- Become acquainted with the Safer Access Framework (p. 30 in part 1)
- Consult with your organisation and, if possible, collect: an existing Code of Conduct or other relevant documents regulating professional behaviour; visibility and identification policies (uniform policy); any guidelines that relate to operational communication
- Revisit the section on the emblems in the chapter ‘The Legal Framework’ in part 1, pages 19–21, as key background information for activity 3 on uniforms and other means of identification
- Perform a basic desktop review of common cultural, religious and traditional customs and ask the management to help you identify some of the potential challenges these may present for ambulance and pre-hospital operations in the given context
- Ask management if it’s possible and appropriate to invite an experienced responder to the session. They can talk to participants and share their first-hand experience of being in a dangerous situation

### INTRODUCTION TO THIS SESSION

This session will help participants to develop tactics for safer access. The activities will be a starting point for recognising how one’s behaviour can reduce risks. This section will end with recommendations on how to work towards better procedures and practices.

The facilitator goes through the session outline.

### ACTIVITY 1: THE SAFER ACCESS FRAMEWORK (SAF)

**Main issues to be highlighted:** The behaviour of the individual ambulance provider can influence the acceptance of the ambulance service and increase the security of colleagues.

**Introduction:** The facilitator introduces and displays the SAF cycle (part 1, p. 32).

**Group work:** Divide participants into four groups with each group focusing on one element of the SAF cycle: Perception, Acceptance, Security and Access. Ask the groups to brainstorm about the different factors that influence each of these elements, based on their experiences.

**Plenary discussion:** Participants briefly present the factors they discussed (suggested maximum of three elements from each group) and then the facilitator asks the participants to explain how the four elements of the cycle relate to each other: Perception, Acceptance, Security, Access. Participants are asked: How can our behaviour affect each element of the cycle, both positively and negatively?

**Suggestion for wrap-up:** It is important to deliver quality healthcare, manage expectations, earn the trust of the people we aim to assist and protect, and create a culture in which everyone feels safe. Appropriate behaviour can help provide safer access, while inappropriate behaviour from just one ambulance provider can seriously affect their security, as well as the safety of team members, patients and bystanders, and the reputation of the EMS as a whole.

Safe access is gained over time:

- Acceptance and perception are built through services that ambulance providers and healthcare workers deliver in peaceful contexts (e.g. people recognise the emblem and the uniform and associate them with a specific behaviour)
- In risk situations, there is usually a need for additional engagement to gain access and build acceptance
In their own words: from an ambulance provider

DEALING WITH ALCOHOL AND VIOLENCE

The incident
In general, our city is peaceful. Most conflicts happen because someone is drunk. One constant issue is that we often arrive at the scene before the police, so there’s no crowd control and no one to stop us being verbally or physically assaulted.

One evening, the office received a call about a motorbike accident. Our team arrived on-scene approximately four minutes from the EOC. It was chaos. Several bystanders seemed to be drunk, and the unconscious patient had been moved from his original position. Bystanders were shouting and saying we had been too slow. They wanted us to drive the patient to hospital immediately. As team leader, I explained that we were there to provide proper care before taking the patient to hospital. A number of bystanders refused to listen. The argument continued and a drunk bystander pushed one of the ambulance crew. He said he was a ‘village official’ and threatened to sue us if we didn’t do what he said. The team continued to treat the patient but, with the ongoing commotion and accusations, we lost our composure and there was nearly a fight. The police arrived just in time. The team calmed down and went back to their work.

Analysis
We should never have reacted – and pretended not to hear the bystander. We are trained and prepared for these types of scenarios, but we are also human. Sometimes we react badly to a situation. This incident has highlighted several things for me. Our country does not have an established EMS law to protect ambulance providers – instead we are working with the guidance of disaster risk reduction. A lot of people have misconceptions about our work. This can mean that they become a threat to us – especially if they are drunk.

Lessons learned
We are strengthening our security through multiagency coordination and by establishing a crowd-control unit. Our office has engaged a number of trainers on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) to provide us with a support team after traumatic events. The office also runs community-based disaster risk reduction and management (CBDRRM) to help tackle misconceptions about our job. We have also established links to the Department of Health’s Violence and Injury Protection Program (VIPP) to address our existing problems on violence.

ACTIVITY 2: BEHAVIOUR AND A CODE OF CONDUCT

Main issues to be highlighted: A Code of Conduct (CoC) is not a document to sign and put away; it is a vital tool to help ambulance providers deliver a safer response.

TIP

Safety may also include behaviours that make sure operational procedures are followed carefully – for example, a basic vehicle check (tyres, fuel, spares).

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic based on a selection of the below information.

Important!

This training evaluates the organisation’s existing practices and procedures and generates recommendations on how to strengthen these where there are gaps. You must keep management informed before and after the session. For example: have they given consent for the CoC or other relevant documents to be assessed by the participants?

Highlight: The existing CoC should not be challenged, but the understanding of its importance should be reinforced.

A CoC is a framework for ethical decision-making which ambulance providers commit to when joining the ambulance and pre-hospital services. It is a written collection of rules, values, principles and behaviours that the organisation believes in and will put into practice. The CoC also communicates an overall picture of the organisation to the public. When each ambulance provider agrees to the CoC, the risk of large variations in the work of different ambulance providers is reduced. Breach of CoC is taken seriously and will have consequences for the individual.

tinyurl.com/chrb5yeh | ambulance_best_practice_report_english.pdf (rodekors.no)
Ambulance providers often work in situations of high tension, and our behaviour can escalate or reduce that tension. So a context-specific CoC is an important part of mitigating risks.

BRAINSTORMING ON A CODE OF CONDUCT

Group reflection: Participants are asked to brainstorm keywords that the CoC should contain. The keyword should be written down on post-it notes.

Plenary discussion: Each group reports to the plenary and places the elements they identified on a flipchart or screen. Based on the feedback from the groups, participants will collectively design an ‘ideal CoC’. Facilitators then provide feedback based on format (Is it clear? Is it too long?) and content (Is it relevant? Is it realistic?).

Plenary discussion: Participants review the risks identified during the risk mapping in sessions 1 and 2, picking out those that relate to the behaviour of ambulance providers. Then they review the ‘ideal CoC’ to see if it tackles those risks.

GROUP WORK

Important! Make sure that management is well-informed and open to review the CoC based on the feedback received. If not, all groups can focus on the group 2 activity.

TIP To avoid too many people in a group, divide into several groups, and distribute the questions equally.

GROUP 1: Review the organisation’s CoC; discuss what is good; recommend up to three changes.

GROUP 2: Review current practice for familiarising ambulance providers with their CoC; recommend three measures to increase knowledge and use of CoC. (Examples for facilitators: signing, training, refreshers, inclusion in evaluations, referred to in other training, displayed in key areas of the station, reporting on violations.)

Plenary discussion: Both groups present their recommendations, and the other participants are given the opportunity to comment.

Closing: The facilitator leads the participants to agree on a set of recommendations on how to strengthen the CoC and/or its implementation.

ACTIVITY 3: UNIFORMS AND OTHER MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION

Main issues to be highlighted: The use of uniforms and other means of identification foster unity. When the ambulance and pre-hospital service has a good reputation within the local community, an identifiable uniform helps protect ambulance providers and makes access easier.

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic and the case, based on the information below.

TIP Ensure case examples suit the cultural and social context you are working in.

Uniforms and other means of identification ensure visibility and unity. Ambulance providers must wear uniform that reflects their skills and service. This way, the community knows what to expect from them. When the ambulance or prehospital service has a strong reputation within the local community, uniforms make it easier to identify and access responders.

Case: An ambulance provider arrives at the scene where someone has been shot. They are wearing a beige uniform and they run towards the victim. A couple of seconds later, security forces shoot at the ambulance provider.

Video: Health care should never be in danger

This film looks at the practical solutions to protect healthcare workers and facilities from around the world and shows that there are direct actions we can follow, implement and share to meaningfully mitigate and prevent violence that targets health workers. (7:10) ICRC | HCID 2021

tinyurl.com/2p9amcfn

Other means of identification may include:
• Personal identification – e.g. ID card, passport
• Protective emblems as described in part 1 ‘The Legal Framework’, pages 19–21
• Vehicles
**Plenary discussion:** The facilitator asks the participants to discuss in pairs for two minutes: What could have caused this? Feedback in the plenary.

By the end of the short discussion the participants should all be aware of the link between security and the colour and format of uniform; in this case, a beige uniform can be confused with that of an armed group and the black first-aid kit could look like a gun holster. In high-risk situations, good visibility of ambulance providers may be key to their access and security. This includes displaying the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem (for National Societies) or the organisational logo.

**Group work:** With management approval, the facilitator distributes or projects images of the uniform(s) used in the participants’ service. Participants are divided into groups and asked to reflect on how safe the choice of the service uniform is. The facilitator can offer guiding questions, such as:
- Is the uniform standardised across the service or are there many different types?
- Are there other organisations, departments, parties or groups with similar uniforms?
- How can this affect perception and safer access?
- How visible is the organisation’s logo on their uniform?

**Plenary discussion:** The groups share their findings. If there are elements of their identification or uniforms that they would like their management to consider, these should also be collected. These will form part of the last session on recommendations to management.

**ACTIVITY 4: WHO ARE WE COMMUNICATING WITH?**

**Main issues to be highlighted:** Good communication improves the safety of ambulance providers. There are differences between internal and external communications. Effective ways to communicate are largely defined by context.

**Introduction:** The facilitator introduces the topic and the case, based on the below information. For this activity, it may be interesting to revisit session 1 (‘Violence against ambulance providers’) and activity 2 (‘Different perceptions’).

The access and security of ambulance providers can be affected by their internal and external communication. How the team communicates with dispatch; how they communicate with patients, community and bystanders; who ensures communication flow within the team; who communicates with the authorities and other agencies. These are all elements to be considered in the service’s SOPs.

**Group work:** Participants are divided into three groups and asked to:
- Provide examples of when communication affected how they were perceived by the community, positively or negatively

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**In their own words: from an ambulance provider**

**GUN INCIDENT ON A CALL-OUT**

**The incident**

Our unit answered a low-priority call to the outskirts of town at 4am: dispatch told us there was a man with pain in his knee. As we got to the address, my supervisor remembered that he had been to the same address just a few weeks ago because someone accidentally shot himself while drunk. The ambulance was parked about 20m away from the apartment. As we went in, I made the lock on the front door stick out so that it could not be pulled shut. The apartment was very poorly lit. According to our operating procedure (+1 rule) we checked all the rooms for extra people.

As I interviewed the patient, I noticed a rifle on the wall which was out of the immediate reach of the patient behind the sofa he was sitting on. I pointed it out to my supervisor with my flashlight and made him aware of it. As I continued interviewing, it became apparent that there wasn’t really anything to treat and that the patient wanted opioids. I explained that there wasn’t anything we could do as he was too intoxicated. When he realised he wasn’t getting what he wanted he asked us, “What if I had a gun?” We saw that he had a pistol next to him on the sofa. My supervisor made a silent alarm through our Tetra radio. To our surprise, the radio gave a dial tone. This alerted the patient and he asked, “Why did you do that?” Then, dispatch on the radio asked us if we were okay (something they shouldn’t do). My supervisor, trying not to provoke the patient, told dispatch we were okay and ready to leave. Dispatch shut the emergency line.

The patient grabbed the gun and aimed at us. My supervisor tapped me in the back and said, “Run!” I ran out of the apartment, my supervisor behind me and our colleague behind him. We got out and continued on foot as the ambulance was too close to the front door. We discovered later that the pistol had been deactivated and the patient couldn’t have shot us with it.

**Analysis**

I was surprised at how calm and rational our team was. Our organisation doesn’t have any specific instructions for these situations other than ‘avoid and escape’, and things developed so quickly that we had to improvise. Because the perpetrator was in the same room, we could only communicate through body language. We
had to rely on that and intuition. We had really good situational awareness about the rest of the apartment and we weren't distracted by others because the patient was the only one there. We did a good job securing a way out and maintaining it throughout the situation. Running was the only move we could make in our situation, but we failed to do the initial surround check with flashlights when we entered the room. That might have given us the chance to flee the scene right away.

**Lesson learned**

We did many things right and as we were trained to do. For example, we secured the escape route and checked the space for extra people. But things can go wrong however you prepare. I realised that we lacked clear CoC for environmental safety during call-outs: it should be standard procedure to make a quick risk assessment on each mission.

The problematic part was the communication between teammates during a stressful situation where you couldn't speak freely to each other. I think we need simple models for how to act when these situations arise, so that we can act as a team without having to communicate first.

We also didn't know there are two ways to make an emergency call through the panic button. Just pushing the button on the radio makes a normal emergency call with a dial tone. To make a silent call, you push two buttons in sequence.

The second serious mistake was when dispatch spoke to us on the radio. According to our guidelines they should listen for at least one minute to determine if there is a threat or violent situation going on. Only if it's clear that this isn't the case should they try to contact us. Afterwards, we were upset with how dispatch handled things. There was some discussion with the dispatch centre as the dispatcher clearly hadn't followed procedures on how to handle emergency calls through the Tetra radio. Dispatch promised to put more resources in training and ensure emergency calls would be handled according to official instructions in the future.

Our employer held a debriefing meeting in the next shift after the situation. This was done according to our guidelines and is a standard procedure after a serious situation. It helps prevent psychological trauma from developing. We talked through the situation and reflected on our actions and feelings during and after the situation. None of us felt the need for further psychological support.

The legal outcome was a disappointment for us. The district attorney made a decision not to press charges, as he believed it was not clear that the patient was threatening us. He argued that the patient probably posed a greater threat to his own life.

Despite a very large number of firearms in our country, it is extremely rare for ambulance personnel to be threatened with weapons. But if anything, that makes it even more important to have simple models for how we should act, because otherwise we rely on luck.

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**Plenary discussion:** Participants share some of the examples. The facilitator follows up by asking participants how any of these individual incidents could have longer term effects on Perception, Acceptance, Security and Access.

**Instructions for the exercise:** If time and technology allow, prepare a survey in advance (using Kahoot, for example), otherwise ask the participants to score the below statements and then discuss and compare scores. The facilitator presents each statement one by one and leaves them all up for everyone to see. Then the below instructions for the individual exercise are shared.

**Individual work:** Scoring the following good practices according to how important you believe they are. How do these good practices relate to their context, and how would you adapt them?

**Plenary discussion:** The facilitator calculates the full score for each as the voting takes place. At the end, participants explain the thinking behind their votes.

Examples of good practices to include:
- Upon arriving at the scene, explain what services will be provided to manage expectations and prevent possible misunderstanding or disappointment
- Refrain from inappropriate behaviour or language at all times
- Show respect for the patient's cultural and religious customs. Familiarise yourself with the traditions of the communities you work with. For example, in the event of a death, responders should know the appropriate way to handle the body before, during and after transport in the ambulance
- Adapt language and tone of voice depending on the situation. In a chaotic environment with many people, it can be more effective to speak loudly and assertively, while empathy must be shown and use a softer tone if the situation is calm and only a few relatives are present
- If assistance is being provided in communities where you do not speak the language, try to make sure someone on the team speaks the language. Healthcare should not be restricted because you do not understand the patient or their community
- All ambulance providers operating in areas with checkpoints or roadblocks should be trained and tested on the relevant dos and don’ts. See examples of these in 'Best practice for ambulance services' (see annex 3 (on p.161)) and the example of a risk mitigation measure

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28 kahoot.com | Learning games
29 tinyurl.com/ch75zy | ambulance_best_practice_report_english.pdf p.23 (redkors.no)
ACTIVITY 5: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Main issue to be highlighted: It is difficult to ensure situational awareness at all times when dealing with a patient in need of urgent help. Given the importance of a safer response, ambulance providers should proactively develop and maintain a relationship with the community.

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic and the case based on the information below.

Ambulance providers must be able to reflect on how a situation affects their behaviour, and vice versa. It is important that they are aware of their personal limits, the limits of the team and the limits of the service. Role playing, simulations, on-the-job coaching and mentor programmes can help with this. While classroom lectures should be kept to a minimum, this session seeks to generate a basic understanding of the concept of situational awareness and to generate some recommendations for further work on this crucial capacity.

Plenary discussion: The facilitator plays the short film The Invisible Gorilla where viewers are asked to count basketball passes. At the end, viewers might have the right answer but have often missed the person in a gorilla costume who walks through the room in the middle of the film. The point is that ambulance providers who are fully focussed on saving the life in front of them can miss crucial elements in their surroundings.

In their own words: from an ambulance provider

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

We were responding to a fairly routine, vague call one night – man down at a train station, no details given. We parked and arrived at the scene on foot. There was little light and no one was around except the patient and the cousin. He said the patient had drunk too much and had to go to hospital. The patient was lying on a bench with alcohol bottles next to him.

After completing the initial assessment, we asked about the events of the evening and about the patient’s medical history. The patient was too drunk to answer, and the cousin did not like the questions. He became angry and verbally threatening before approaching my colleague and trying to punch him in the head. My colleague managed to block the attack with his arms, trying to calm down and push back, but it developed into a wrestling match.

I radio-ed to ask for help. We overpowered the cousin, and the patient remained lying on the bench. A few minutes later, several police cars arrived and the officers took the cousin into custody. When they searched him, they found a large knife tucked into the back of his pants.

Plenary activity: All participants are blindfolded and asked to describe the room they sit in: colour of the ceiling, walls, floor, wall decorations, objects, number of chairs or anything else. The facilitator can ask questions about particular aspects of the room. Blindfolds are removed and participants discuss how much they are aware, or not, of their surroundings.

Plenary discussion: To contextualise the problem, the facilitator leads a discussion on:

- How participants maintain situational awareness at work
- What has taken them by surprise

Facilitator presentation: Introduce the topic and the case based on the below information.

Slide 1 (Introduction): We can train the brain to develop muscle memory just like any other muscle in the body. By practising situational awareness and how to respond, we can put our cognitive awareness skills to use more instinctively in a crisis.

Time-critical reactions are even more crucial when seconds matter; late decisions could mean the difference between life and death.

Ambulance providers can hone their skills through everyday exercises that train the brain to be constantly aware of surroundings.
Slide 2 (OODA Loop): Fighter pilot John Boyd created a system for rapid identification of threats and decision-making called the OODA Loop. OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide and Act.

While the last two steps involve how to respond to an observed threat, the first two steps relate directly to situational awareness. By observing our surroundings, we can orient what we should be looking for, put that information into context and know what to do with the observations.

Responders can build better situational awareness skills through the use of simple games.

Slide 3 (Practical exercises): The following are cognitive situational training exercises described by Van Horne and Riley (2014) in their book *Left of Bang*. These help develop the mental skills necessary to keep responders safe when abroad.

1) ’A’ Game: A is for awareness. You can play this game with a team member after any regular day-to-day encounter. When entering a place (bus, subway, shop), make note of certain items such as the number of exits, number of people working there, colour of the clothes of people in line etc. Once you leave, ask your team member questions like: How many people were in line? What colour shirts did the employees have on? The more you and your teammates play this game, the better you will get at observing your surroundings.

2) The “What if” Game: This is done alone and you can play it any time. It involves simply playing out a scenario in your head. Just ask yourself something like: What would I do if a group of angry men/women suddenly stormed into the room? The more you play this, the better you’ll get at real-time decision-making. You can always have a follow-up discussion with a colleague from the team to see what their reaction would be.

3) Peripheral vision: Try to get better at noticing your peripheral vision by observing things occurring outside of your direct focus. For example, when you’re talking to a colleague in front of you, make note of the movements of someone across the room or at the edge of your vision.

Group work: The facilitator asks the participants to go outside in pairs or groups of three and test their preferred exercise. After each participant has taken a turn, the participants share quick feedback of their impressions in the plenary.

Plenary discussion: The facilitator introduces the next discussion based on the following information:

Every environment we enter has a baseline of what is normal. It will change constantly depending on where we are. Once we have our baseline, we can observe abnormalities, based on the things that do not happen and should, or things that do happen and should not.

The facilitator asks the participants which traits might suggest potential abnormal behaviours that would give away someone’s intention of doing something bad. Point out the importance of avoiding negatively stereotyping.

The facilitator can complement their answers with the following:

- Always notice what is in someone’s hands as they approach, or simply what they are doing with their hands. When trying to conceal a weapon such as a gun or a knife, a person will subconsciously pat or touch the part of the body concealing it. Clenched fists often mean one is preparing for a physical confrontation.
- If someone with bad intentions is trying to blend into a surrounding, they will often try to ‘act natural’. This is very hard to do. Those attempting to ‘act natural’ will often over or under exaggerate their movements.
- People with bad intentions may regularly look behind them. People do this subconsciously when uncomfortable or when they are about to do something abnormal. Be aware that this may also be a result of insecurity.

Important! Remember that some people will show no signs, so the absence of any of these indicators does not mean that there is no likelihood of violence.

Closing: The facilitator shows the video below and concludes: the key to developing good situational awareness is practice, practice, practice.

The facilitator then asks participants to share recommendations they may have in terms of how situational awareness could be improved among the teams in their service.

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Anyone can be carrying a weapon

Video: A film which dramatises the dangers to healthcare workers and shows that anyone can be carrying a weapon or become a threat. (1:54)

[tinyurl.com/2p8f4b3w]

The Monkey Business

Video: An illusion by Daniel Simons which illustrates how unexpected events can often be missed. (1:41)

[tinyurl.com/yuu8rcuv]
In their own words: from an ambulance provider

ROADBLOCK ATTACK

The incident

Spontaneous mass protests had broken out up and down the country because of the huge increase in fuel prices. This was the largest and most widespread general strike in the country’s history.

Thousands of people were gathering daily in cities and protesters marched and set up barricades. Young people played football on the road and organised music, dancing and food, all of which made vehicle movement difficult. At barricades, union vehicles and cars with flags were attacked, showing the extent of the public’s distrust towards the government.

On the first day of the protest, I was appointed to lead a group of Red Cross members at the local branch. While I was driving others around to give first-aid, we came to a certain barricade point in the zone. We were taunted, and as the driver, I was pulled out of the car.

The mob tried to take off everything I was wearing. My team members shielded me, and it took their intervention to get rid of the mob and save my life so we could carry on. My car was dented, and the handset was missing. My heart skipped a beat and I was scared to the bone. I could not forget this incident afterwards.

Analysis

One of our team was absent the following day and decided to give up volunteering. We had to work really hard to convince her to stay. A lot of work was put into creating awareness of the services provided by aid workers and we organised first-aid training for the transporters. And because training is key, volunteers were also trained in managing threats and the risk of violence. Refresher training is organised regularly, and we also include negotiation skills in our programmes now, too.

Lessons learned

I learned that we have to be prepared for hostility in crowds, even at the point of dispatch. I now know that we need to involve local trained personnel when we’re out on the road, whether volunteering or providing first-aid – especially where there are protests, elections or other situations.

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ACTIVITY 6: CULTURE, RELIGION AND TRADITION (CRT)

Main issues to be highlighted: Everyone has personal assumptions about different cultures, religions and traditions. This includes ambulance providers and the communities they respond to. While traditional norms are per definition relatively static, the way in which traditions are interpreted changes over time and may vary from one place to another.

Presentation: The facilitator frames the discussion based on the below information. This will help ensure that the discussion on these big concepts remains focused. Where applicable, the facilitator may provide examples of how these may relate to an ambulance and pre-hospital response (for example dead body management, pressing a wound in first aid, male responders treating female patients).

CRT and scene safety

Points to be considered by facilitator when leading discussions on CRT:

- Consider the fact that while people speaking the same language may seem uncomplicated, the real challenge is when people do speak the same language, but still present deep cultural/religious/traditional differences
- Always consider components that include vital space and personal distance, body language, touch, eye contact, tone and pitch, etc. What in some cultures will be considered completely normal may be perceived as aggressive and frightening in other cultures
- How we express our feelings varies from person to person, but there are also different customs in different cultures. It is important to know and be open to the different reactions of people in crisis as well as the specific culture's accepted way of behaving and expressing themselves in given situations
- There may be different approaches to questions concerning diseases (such as cancer, HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, etc.) along with perceptions and reactions regarding the end of life. This can be a source of tension and create unsafe situations for ambulance providers. Feel free to spend some time discussing this topic
- Gender and medical response
- Reflect on what and how you as an ambulance provider think and feel when dealing with situations such as not being allowed to treat someone of the opposite sex or that, for instance, a male relative or patient does not want to talk to the female ambulance provider

How can reflection on these themes make the scene safer for you as an ambulance provider?
CULTURE

Culture or civilisation includes common customs, values, social rules of conduct, beliefs, rituals and traditions, perceptions of human nature and natural events. It makes us a member of society. Different countries have different cultures and different communities. Even families may also adopt different cultural practices. Culture affects many aspects of life – from how we communicate and celebrate to how we perceive the world around us and how we are perceived. There are many things that shape our personal culture, and we all hear and see our surroundings in different ways.

Understanding how we present ourselves to others can open the possibility for others to share who they are. Thus, we will all be able to function more effectively in the context of cultural differences.

Cultural competence is related to having and showing respect for others and accepting that there are many ways of viewing the world. This does not mean that you must be an expert on all cultures or share views and values with the person or people you are treating, but more that care is given free from predetermined assumptions. Having cultural competence helps us to ask the right questions, in the right way, so that we get the right information and can provide the right treatment. By doing so, we can assume that the tolerance for us as medical assistants increases and consequently the risk of being harmed is reduced.

Although workplace violence has a universal understanding, its perception and understanding may still vary between different cultures. This cultural difference should be considered:

- By using appropriate terminology that reflects the common language of a particular culture
- With particular emphasis on forms of violence in the workplace that have a special relevance in a particular culture
- With a special effort to identify and detect situations of violence in the workplace that are difficult to detect and accept as a reality due to specific cultural background.

RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY

Religion and spirituality may include different perceptions and cultural patterns of action that presuppose reality as more than the physical, measurable world. These are a personal set or institutionalised system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices. Religions often present answers to human existential wonder. This distinguishes religion from beliefs that do not necessarily imply a belief in something non-physical.

TRADITION

Tradition is a form of social practice or perception that is passed on, e.g. from generation to generation, in a society or group. The task of tradition is to tie together the old and the new to create a historical continuity for a group or the members of a society. The content of the tradition is often linked to cultural elements that are believed to be particularly valuable because they form an essential part of a society’s or group’s social heritage.

Plenary activity: The facilitator gives a number to each participant from 1–6 and assigns questions for reflection accordingly. Everyone is given five minutes to reflect on their question privately. Anyone who wants to share may of course do so, but it should be clear that this is optional (given the inherent private sensitivities).

- What are your personal assumptions about people who are different from you?
- What values do you stand for?
- How do you react when someone says something against your faith or traditions?
- Have you or others you know experienced being stereotyped based on religion or beliefs? Try and put words to how that feels
- Why do you think spirituality, faith, and religion are important to people?
- How is your reaction to a negative coping strategy based on religion/tradition/local customs that can hinder the effective provision of healthcare?
- Do you know what medical ethics says in terms of respect to patients and impartiality of care?

31 For more information and examples of activities, see the Washington Health Department’s manual on Multicultural Awareness for prehospital EMS professionals: tinyurl.com/3jdc9xim
32 tinyurl.com/vpqzlahu
33 www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion
34 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tradition
35 Medical Ethics Manual: tinyurl.com/try6dsmf (icrc.org)
36 The responsibilities of health-care personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies: tinyurl.com/24du7jpj (healthcareindanger.org)
SCENARIOS FOR REFLECTION

Burial attacks in Sierra Leone
A report of healthcare personnel attacked for conducting burials against the customary rules of the local communities in Sierra Leone.
tinyurl.com/2h438cb4

Massacre in Guinea
A report of healthcare personnel attacked for conducting burials against the customary rules of the local communities in Guinea.
tinyurl.com/yc35mvev

In their own words: from an ambulance provider

ALCOHOL AND VERBAL VIOLENCE

The incident
I was in a small rural city for a three-night shift. On my second night, we received a priority 2 call (meaning urgent and possibly life-threatening). It was in a remote native settlement, about a 40-minute drive away.

Once we got there, we took our equipment and walked a distance to get to the patient. Our dispatch centre had told us that we were dealing with a woman with a head injury.

A lady showed us the way to the patient. Her English wasn't great and I couldn't understand her. The patient had a head wound and severe bleeding. She mixed her native language with some English. It turned out that she had been hit with something on her head by her partner. The lady was drunk.

It was dark so I used my torch to help with the assessment. More and people from the village showed up at the scene. Many were drunk. The patient's accusations against her partner became louder. We soon realised he was one of the bystanders.

We persuaded the patient to walk with us to the ambulance. I thought about running to the ambulance to switch on the outside lights but didn't want to leave my partner alone.

While walking to the ambulance, the patient fell to the ground twice and started crying and shouting. At one point, she refused to carry on, but her friend convinced her to let us treat her.

At the ambulance, some drunk men (most likely friends of the potential perpetrator) were standing in our way. They started to verbally attack us and our patient. It was barely possible to calm them down as I did not speak or understand their native language.

Once again, we had to convince the patient to trust us. Eventually, we managed to get her inside the ambulance.

I accompanied my partner inside the back of the ambulance to help with the examination and we soon realised we had to get her to hospital.

People tried to open the ambulance door while we examined the patient. As I stepped outside to get to the front of the ambulance, I was once again verbally attacked. One guy spat at my feet but was held back by other bystanders.

Eventually, we made it to the hospital and were able to hand over the patient safely. We were not physically attacked or harmed, but the situation could have deteriorated at any time.

Analysis
Normally, volunteer ambulance officers have a good reputation at all levels of society. I was surprised that the people in this settlement were so aggressive towards us. We wanted to help.

My partner was very calm and concentrated on the patient while keeping a close eye on the surroundings at the same time. He did not interact with aggressors unless necessary. He did not accuse or blame anybody. And he was careful not to mention the police. It was good fortune that he had the role of the clinician for this case.

We have distress buttons on our mobile radio that can immediately alarm the police, but this seemed unnecessary. I felt it would cause more problems because the police aren't well respected there.

Besides, any type of backup from the police would have required the same 40-minute drive. And as the only ambulance crew, more ambulance backup would have (a) left another rural community without coverage and (b) required at least an hour's driving time to reach us.

Looking back, we should have illuminated our outside working light right from the start. I shouldn't have joined my partner in the back of the ambulance, and we should have taken off immediately. We could have stopped a distance away from the settlement and crowd.

I am more aware of cultural and language problems now. I inform myself of what kind of area we are going to and what I should expect to find. Further steps have already been taken to implement a zero-tolerance strategy. In the future, I will ask for backup if possible.
Role play: The facilitator asks for nine volunteers and separates them into a group of six and a group of three.

How to facilitate for active role play
Encourage participants to imagine that they are experiencing a situation in real life and showing the reactions in their own way, so that they can act as realistically as possible. Don’t make the situation too complicated as this can be frustrating and disrupt learning.

Instructions for group of six: This group should play out a response to a car accident. The different roles are: one unconscious patient, three ambulance providers and two bystanders that are trying to involve themselves and are in the way.

Instructions for group of three: This group is going to play three relatives of the patient who are scared, angry and aggressive. They speak a local language and do not understand the ambulance providers well. They do not want the patient to be handled by someone of the opposite sex nor to die in hospital where they believe people are immediately cremated after death. Others are not aware of these instructions.

Instructions for the observers: Observers will be taking notes on what they see during this emergency situation. They are asked to pay particular attention to elements related to culture, religion, tradition, and professional jargon.

Plenary activity: The observers present what they have seen, followed by the group of six sharing what they experienced when the three relatives entered the scene. Finally, the participants who played the relatives share the instructions they were provided before the role play.

The facilitator then guides the group to discuss how cultural competence plays a role within the context in which they operate. They should discuss how a lack of cultural competence can adversely affect the safer access cycle’s four elements, both in the short and the longer term.

Closing: If the group has any specific recommendations related to CRT on how ambulance providers can further reduce the risk in their context, these are collected by the facilitator.

Takeaways
Individual work: The facilitator asks participants to individually write down one or two follow-up measures from each activity. What do participants think are the most important measures for reducing threats and violence against ambulance providers in their organisation (CoC, uniforms and other means of identification, communication, situational awareness and CRT)? Participants should present and discuss all the suggestions in the plenary.

Plenary agreement: Agree and consolidate the key points from this session. These are collected by the facilitator to bring to session 6.

Wrap-up
One wrap-up approach is the confirmation pyramid, in which everyone stands together in a circle. The facilitator begins by describing the group using a positive word. Another participant follows on from this, firstly describing the group using a positive term and then bringing up a positive experience from this session. Continue until everyone has had their turn. The facilitator then closes the session.

See page 145 for a list of resources and further reading for this session.
SESSION 4:
MANAGING AGGRESSION
AND INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session participants will:

• have explored different scenarios where aggression and violence may occur
• understand the connection between reactions, emotions and needs
• be aware of how to contribute to de-escalation of aggression and interpersonal violence
• have become familiar with practical skills in non-violent communication and conflict management

SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the training</td>
<td>Presentation of the rationale for this session, the involvement of the participants and how it's relevant</td>
<td>5 mins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1: Contextualising why aggressions occur | • Plenary discussion on potential reasons for interpersonal aggression  
• Contextualising in groups              | 45 mins                   |
| 2: Human needs and basic emotions       | • Individual work/brainstorming on the connection between stress and feelings  
• Plenary discussions on self-awareness of emotions and behaviour  | 40 mins                   |
| 3: Vital space                          | Plenary activities to inform about the principle of the vital space as a form of sphere | 10 mins                   |
| 4: Contextualising good communication   | • Discuss experiences of poor and effective communications  
• Individual exercise  
• Plenary discussion  
• Collection of final recommendations | 45 mins                   |
| 5: Active listening                     | Plenary and in-pair discussions on active listening                  | 30 mins                   |
| 6: Non-violent communication            | Facilitator presentation followed by plenary discussion, activity and group work on non-violent communication as a tool | 1 hour 30 mins           |
SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7: Escalating and de-escalating reactions</td>
<td>Group work to explore different ways of responding to scale down a potential conflict</td>
<td>1 hour 30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Takeaways</td>
<td>Plenary consolidation of takeaways from the sections</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Wrap-up</td>
<td>Brief summary of the session in the plenary</td>
<td>5 mins</td>
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PROPOSED SESSION TIME

6 HOURS 30 MINS

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR

Make a plan/agenda for this session
- Familiarise yourself with the theory provided in this session
- Become acquainted with the ‘Training Manual on Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities’ see QR-code on p. 10 in part 1

INTRODUCTION AND AIM

This section provides the participants with a basic understanding of how violence and the threat of violence can affect ambulance providers. It aims to develop relevant interpersonal communication skills to de-escalate and prevent conflictual situations. The use of examples and role-play is the starting point for participants to learn how to identify the essential human emotions that can trigger violent behaviour.

Highlight: The facilitator should clarify that the soft skills that will be trained in this session are not sufficient in situations of extreme danger such as armed attack or structural sexual violence. The skills provided by this training do not aim to equip participants to deal with such extreme situations; rather, they focus on lower levels of aggression and interpersonal violence that can be addressed using basic interpersonal skills. The facilitator goes through the session outline.

ACTIVITY 1: CONTEXTUALISING WHY AGGRESSIONS OCCUR

Main issues to be highlighted: When met with aggressive behaviour, ambulance providers can influence the situation by the way they react and behave. This requires the capacity to be aware of and control one’s own emotions in such a situation.

Introduction: The facilitator sets the scene stating that in crisis or other stressful situations, strong emotions and reactions can more easily arise. These are usually normal reactions to an abnormal situation. As ambulance providers, it can be stressful and frustrating that someone reacts in an aggressive manner, especially if you are trying to help that person or someone they care about.

Plenary discussion: The facilitator asks the participants why they think interpersonal aggression can take place. Answers can be supplemented with the following points:
- Aggression may occur when a person is insecure, frustrated or angry, feels powerless or lacks information
- Aggression can help the person to regain control in the short term in confusing situations
- Aggression can be observed both in people who are still thinking logically, and in people who are in such a crisis that logical arguments do not materialise

Group work: Divide participants into groups of three to four and provide them with paper and pens. Ask participants to share situations where they experienced aggressive behaviour or violence while on duty. Remind participants that situations of extreme danger such as armed attack or sexual violence will not be the focus of this section.

TIP If someone discloses an incident of sexual or gender based violence to you:
- Note that providing information is an essential part of helping
- Listen carefully, do not doubt, do not judge
- Be informed of the services available inside and outside the organisation (such as a hotline or a referral system)
- Share this critical information. Do not give advice you are not trained to give
- Remember consent
- Keep any disclosure confidential

In the plenary, each of the groups share two or three of the situations they have discussed. The facilitator notes down key words for the types of situations on a flip chart (for example: “worried relatives” or “check point aggression”).

Plenary activity: Participants are asked to suggest ways in which these situations can be diffused.
Examples may include:
- Remain calm and be polite
- Speak slowly and calmly
- Ask what the person needs and try to help with this, rather than reacting to anger
- Provide information about:
  - What is happening?
  - What is your task?
  - Who else can provide help?

This may look easy on paper, but as many of the participants already know, when you are in the middle of a situation it can be much more confusing and difficult.

In their own words: from an ambulance provider

**LACK OF UNDERSTANDING FROM BYSTANDERS**

The incident
I witnessed a car accident involving a large bus on a remote route. This community has experienced many traffic accidents because of the mountainous terrain and steep roads. My family and I were driving directly behind the bus when it happened.

I started to provide first aid, responding without a team of responders. I was able to get about seven more people to help me treat and evacuate the injured. Some of the casualties went to the nearest Government hospital, a two-hour drive away. Others went to a cottage hospital in the same community. Unfortunately, the staff were on strike there.

I did my best, including performing chest compressions on someone who I already knew, deep down, was dead. Her companion would not let me stop. I was exhausted and tried to explain that I needed to help others, especially the bleeding casualties and someone with a suspected spinal cord injury. The companion said I was a “bad nurse” and told me I had to do my job and keep her sister alive. This person pulled at me and dragged me around until someone intervened.

Analysis
I imagine this violent incident occurred because of the following factors:
- Frustration at being unable to get a professional health response
- A poor health system with no contingency plans or emergency response system on the highway

The situation could also have been mitigated if there had been more knowledge about the presence or existence of first-aiders as well as the emblems of the society in question.

Adequate infrastructure and health facilities with the right staff and hospital supplies would have alleviated the situation. If there had been proper, rapid continuity in the care of the wounded, the spectators and relatives would have acted differently.

Also, people need to be aware that health professionals, no matter what capacity they serve, should never be exposed to any form of violence. Awareness must be created in this case.

**Lessons learned**
I’ve learned that emergency responses have limitations, and one person cannot do everything. It is important to step back if you feel overwhelmed and don’t feel safe to continue. Engaging other actors, especially bystanders, is important. This might mitigate and control negative reactions.

If I did this again, I would take control my emotions more. I’d calm everyone down, then introduce myself properly as a skilled first-aider. I would also give spectators specific roles such as helping with evacuation, or taking care of victims in the best possible way.

**ACTIVITY 2: HUMAN NEEDS AND THE BASIC EMOTIONS**

**Main issues to be highlighted:** Stressing the importance of understanding the relationship between the unmet needs of a person, emotions and his/her aggressive behaviour. If we are able to identify the unmet needs of the person in front of us, we can try to de-escalate the situation by meeting them in the best way possible.

**Introduction:** The facilitator explains that emotions and needs are closely connected. In difficult and stressful circumstances, physical or psychological aggression and violence is produced by high emotions, which in turn appear because of some unmet needs.

**Activity:** The facilitator asks the participants to reflect on the different emotions that arise when our needs are and are not met and how we react to them. These reactions should then be written down on post-its.
Plenary discussion: The facilitator writes the four basic human emotions as titles on four separate flipcharts and asks the participants to stick their post-its under the core emotion to which they relate.

1) ANGER
2) FEAR
3) SADNESS
4) HAPPINESS

Depending on the size of the group, the facilitator may ask between two and four volunteers to share their experiences. The facilitator leads the participants in a plenary discussion focussed on highlighting that anger is usually a secondary emotion. It means that anger seldom arrives alone; it is rather an expression of another deeper emotion such as fear or sadness. For example: fear can be expressed by a person becoming angry and confrontational. As these emotions are closely interrelated, it can be confusing both for the person who experiences it and for the people around.

The facilitator asks participants the following questions (if the time allows for it, the two questions could be first responded to while working in pairs before discussing as a group):

• Ask participants: Can you think of a situation during your work where the manifested anger most likely was an expression of other feelings or fears?
• Follow up by asking: Why is this understanding important in defining how we react to a person facing us with anger?

Closing: When we meet people who are angry or aggressive it can often be more effective to try to identify their underlying emotions and meet their underlying needs, rather than to react to the anger itself. Thinking in this way may also help you to keep your own calm, rather than to inherit the feelings and reactions of the other party.

In their own words: from an ambulance provider

COMMUNITY FEAR AND ATTITUDE TO AMBULANCE PROVIDERS

The incident
I was leading a team of nine in a difficult-to-access community. Our volunteers told us that sick people were showing signs of EVD (Ebola Virus Disease) but their family members refused to take them for treatment or call an ambulance.

I called an ambulance myself and went to convince the family members to let me take their sick family members to the emergency treatment unit (ETU). They refused and would not even allow us near the house.

When the ambulance arrived a few hours later, the community members were furious and threatened to burn the ambulance. It was one of the scariest moments in my fight against Ebola. The people were supposed to be under quarantine but broke all regulations, including wanting to touch us, which would expose us to the virus. There were so many life-threatening complications for me and my team. We just wanted to save the lives of the sick and take them to the ETU.

Analysis
We were later told that two of our local volunteers went to the town manager to explain the incident. They also left someone with us on the spot who spoke the local dialect, asking to let us transport the sick to the treatment centre. The mayor came and intervened, and the families agreed that their loved ones could be transported on the condition that we update them on the prognosis of their loved ones.

We quickly accepted and delegated responsibilities. As the Ebola coordinator, I was responsible for providing the follow-ups, which we did through through the mayor. It was a perfect arrangement and helped to improve the relationship we had with the members of the community. It also built further trust in the Red Cross work.

Lessons learned
Community: The community didn’t know much about the Ebola virus – transmission pattern, prevention or dangers. They had a myth that health professionals spread the virus, so they shouldn’t go to healthcare facilities with their loved ones. They were angry because previously when people had been taken to ETU, they heard nothing from them. They believed that when sick people were taken to ETU, they were sprayed with a toxic solution that would kill them.

There was a lack of trust in the system, with no feedback mechanism from the treatment unit to the community members regarding the progress of the patient’s condition. The dead body management team, which is run by the Red Cross, was also faster than the ambulance run by the authorities. Members of the community couldn’t tell the difference between them.

Response: There were many disruptions among humanitarian workers and major partners, including the government through the Ministry of Health. We did not respond in time due to many factors that were beyond our control (unfortunate road networks, rainy season with flooded bridges, poor network connection and so on).

ACTIVITY 3: VITAL SPACE

Main issues to be highlighted: Not everyone is comfortable with the same proximity to other people. Standing very close to another person can intentionally communicate some sort of provocation.
The facilitator asks all participants to freely move in the room and let them find the place where they feel most comfortable. Some are then asked individually why they specifically chose this place. The goal is to make them realise that we tend to position ourselves at a comfortable distance from other people and in a way that provides us with a better overview.

**Plenary activity:** One participant stands still, and another is asked to slowly walk towards him or her, starting from about 5–10 metres away. The one walking should stop at the limit of his or her comfort zone and explain the decision to stop by providing details about the feelings involved. The facilitator will define this border or threshold as the limits of this participant's vital space. The other participant, who was standing still, provides an account of how he or she experienced it and whether his or her vital space is the same, larger or smaller than that of the colleague.

**Activity 4: Contextualising Good Communication**

**Main issues to be highlighted:** As individuals we take on different roles in different situations. If we understand this, we are better able to control the role we take and how we communicate, rather than letting our emotions drive us in that situation.

**Pair discussion:** The facilitator asks all the participants to find four words that answer the question: What are the most important elements of good communication? The participants have three minutes to write each of the four words on different post-it notes. Participants partner up and agree on which of their combined eight words they believe are the most important, ending up with a prioritised new four words. No new words can be added, and participants are not allowed to change the words or put two words together. This should also take three minutes.

The process continues in the same manner with each pair joining another pair to make groups of four. Together they spend three minutes finding a new combination of four words from these two lists. The groups of four then join together in groups of eight to make a new list of four words. The process continues until the whole group has made a priority of all the lists, ending with one list with four words common for all participants.

**Plenary activity:** The facilitator asks all participants to freely move in the room and let them find the place where they feel most comfortable. Some are then asked individually why they specifically chose this place. The goal is to make them realise that we tend to position ourselves at a comfortable distance from other people and in a way that provides us with a better overview.

**Plenary activity:** The facilitator asks all participants to freely move in the room and let them find the place where they feel most comfortable. Some are then asked individually why they specifically chose this place. The goal is to make them realise that we tend to position ourselves at a comfortable distance from other people and in a way that provides us with a better overview.

**Activity 5: Active Listening**

**Main issues to be highlighted:** While we are relatively aware of our verbal communication, the nonverbal signals that we display when another person is talking to us are usually less deliberate. It is important to understand that these signals affect the person who is talking to us.

**Introduction:** The facilitator introduces the topic based on a selection of the below information.

Active listening is a communication skill that is about being present in the conversation and giving full attention to the person who is talking by showing openness, interest and respect. The ability to actively listen can help to strengthen relations by creating understanding, trust, improving cooperation and reducing conflicts. Active listening is important in all communication and especially in stressed and conflictual situations. Fortunately, it is a skill that can be improved with training.

**Plenary discussion:** The facilitator asks the participants: What is active listening? What do we do (or do not) when we are listening actively?

The key points are written down and the facilitator adds to the list if any of the following actions are missing:

- Maintain eye contact
- Be aware of body language (e.g. nodding, facial expressions, posture, sitting position)
- Make noises and give feedback (e.g. “mmm,” “oh,” “exactly,” “oh really?”/ “how interesting?”)
Think about vocalisation and tone of voice
Be aware of our own judgments, prejudices and interpretations
Avoid interruptions or criticisms
Ask questions about things you might not have understood, or simply to have the speaker go into greater detail about the topic

Pair discussion: Participants are divided into pairs. They take turns in telling each other about something that is important to them (goals in life, principles they try to live by, something they feel they need to improve, etc.). The other participant will start by acting as an active listener, but after about a minute, switch to being a poor listener.

Closing: The facilitator concludes the activity based on the following information:

When interacting with others, we often do not listen properly. Perhaps we are distracted by our own thoughts or by something else that is happening in the room (e.g. TV, mobile phone, other patients). We sometimes start sharing our own thoughts, interpretations, conclusions and suggestions for solutions, before the other person has had time to finish telling their story. Alternatively, we ‘steal’ the story by starting to talk about something similar that has happened to us – we think that our story is bigger, worse or more significant.

How the listener listens may have a large effect on how well the speaker talks. The person who is listening gives both verbal and nonverbal signals that affect the person who is talking and even the message that is conveyed. The attitude, the way we stand or sit, our gaze, facial expressions, gestures, touch and physical distance, are all involved in signalling to others how we feel and how much attention we are giving to what is being said. This nonverbal communication often takes place unconsciously.

ACTIVITY 6: NON-VIOLENT COMMUNICATION

Main issues to be highlighted: Language choices have a huge impact on how effective your communication is. Our use or abuse of words in daily conversation can be transformative or destructive.

Introduction: The facilitator introduces the topic based on a selection of the below information. (It is recommended that the facilitator write down key words on a flip chart while describing the You-language and I-language, to help clarify the differences.)

While you may not consider anything you have ever said to be violent, some words are considered more violent than others in that they make people feel threatened or attacked, which in turn makes people defend themselves and often attack back. Words that make us defensive are generalisations like “always” and “never”, as well as demands such as “you have to” or “you cannot”.

Non-violent communication is designed to strip away the narrative people automatically build in their heads – that big looming cloud of supposition you might be carrying around about a person or situation.

Non-violent communication can similarly be an effective tool for meeting people that are experiencing strong emotions, like fear, anger or sadness to be able to identify and meet their needs.

Marshall Rosenberg distinguishes between two characteristic ways of speaking that can affect the development of a conflict either towards an escalation or a de-escalation:

You-language contributes to the conflict escalating. When using You-language we blame the other person. We call this “You-language” – because when we use it our focus is on how you (the other person) reacts, handles the situation, manages a task. In other words, it is your fault. You-language often also contains requirements and demands about what the other shall or must not do. As a result, the recipient often becomes defensive and naturally enough starts a counterattack.

I-language contributes to de-escalate conflicts and can facilitate an understanding and closeness that increases the chance of a common solution. We call this “I-language” – because when we use it our focus is on how I see a situation, how it affects me and my needs. I take responsibility for my own emotions and reactions, rather than demand actions from others. Because I-language does not include a negative evaluation of the others, the disagreement does not harm the relationship but instead generates empathy.

Plenary discussion: The facilitator introduces the key message below and asks participants what the implications are for ambulance providers.

Key message: In stressful situations we are often unable to have an overview of what is happening before we feel that we have been heard and understood. If we find that the other person has heard or understood what we need, then we can calm down and hear what is being communicated to us as well.

The facilitator can use the following example as an explanation:

In a conflict in which one person is more upset than the other (for example, the father with an injured son, who thinks that the nurse is not doing his or her job properly), the most effective method can be to first listen and allow the upset individual to feel that she is being understood. This person will then often calm down enough for a dialogue to be possible.
Plenary activity: The facilitator draws a person and explains the four steps in Rosenberg’s model of non-violent communication, focusing on constructing a sentence in the following structure: “When I see/hear that ..., then I get/feel/become..., because I need..., therefore I would like that...”

1) **Observations:** What you see or hear, without evaluating, interpreting or criticising. The observation should be as specific as possible.
   For example: “When I see/hear that...”

2) **Emotions:** How this situation makes you feel, how it affects you personally.
   For example: “…I get/feel/become...”

3) **Needs:** What your underlying needs, values or desires are that cause these emotions.
   For example: “...because I need...”

2) **Wishes:** Specific actions you would like the other person to take that would help you get your needs met. It is important that this is a wish and not a requirement, so that one is not angry with the other person if the wish is not granted.
   For example: “Therefore I would like that...”

Participants take turns in constructing examples of statements that take into account the four above elements. After each statement, other participants are invited to provide feedback to the statement before the facilitator does.

Group work: Rosenberg connects feelings and needs, identifying that a person’s feelings are a reflection of that person’s unmet needs. So, while I may be tempted to say that I am frustrated because you are not doing your job properly, this method helps me see and communicate that I am frustrated because I need information, I need to feel safe, or I need to feel control in the situation.

Bearing this in mind, when we talk to someone who is very upset, it is useful to try to identify what the underlying feelings and needs are. We should try to meet these, rather than confront the anger. The participants are divided into groups of three or four and asked to:
- Identify a realistic scenario during ambulance and pre-hospital operations in which this approach could practically be implemented
- Under each of the four steps, identify questions that could be asked to help people identify their needs or formulate their wishes

The groups share their reflections in the plenary. The other groups and the facilitator complement where relevant, highlighting the potential such questions can have in de-escalating a situation.

**Key questions could include:**

**Observations:**
- What happened?

**Feelings:**
- How did you experience the situation?
- How is it now?
- Confirming emotions: I understand that you are frustrated. I can see that you are upset, and that is understandable.

**Needs:**
- What do you need?

**Wishes:**
- What can be done to make the situation better?

**TIP** Some participants may find the *I-language* to be a naive approach to take in a situation where someone behaviors aggressively. This approach is indeed not infallible, and it will be implemented with varying degrees of success based on their individual capacities. Already staying focussed on avoiding *You-language* will reduce the chances of further escalation. But rather than defending the approach, the facilitator should let the rest of the group explore the topic by asking: Does anyone have other thoughts or ideas about this?

**ACTIVITY 7: ESCALATING AND DE-ESCALATING REACTIONS**

Main issues to be highlighted: Our immediate reactions in a tense situation are usually emotional. With continuous awareness raising and training we are increasingly able to manage our emotional reaction and implement de-escalation techniques.

The facilitator briefly introduces this activity by stating that, unless we are experts in non-violent communication, our immediate reactions in a tense situation are often emotional. We may give a reaction in what we say, through a gesture, an eye movement or many other ways. This activity seeks to capture some of those behavioural details from the participants’ own context and reflect on how they may escalate or de-escalate a given situation.
Group work: In this exercise, the participants will be exploring different methods of reacting in difficult situations.

1) The facilitator asks the participants to spend three minutes to reflect upon a conflict or tense situation they have been part of and that they felt they did not handle in a good way. The situation should preferably be related to a work situation, but can also have happened at home, among friends or in a social situation.

2) The participants are then divided into smaller groups of three or four. They are given 15 minutes to tell each other briefly about the situations.

3) Each group then chooses one of the stories for further work. They spend the next 10 minutes exploring the following alternatives:
   • What is the most likely way to react in this situation?
   • What could be the most escalating way to act in this situation?
   • How could you act in this situation in order to de-escalate the conflict?

4) The facilitator informs the groups that they should now make a role-play for each of the three alternatives and gives them 15 minutes to practice performing the role-plays. Make it clear that whoever told the story to the group should not play himself in the role-play. The role-play should be shorter than three minutes in total.

   **TIP** It may be good to have a back-up scenario prepared in case the group scenarios do not meet the objectives of the exercise.

5) The role-plays are then performed for the wider group, but if short on time, the facilitator chooses one or two that seem to be of most value to the group (one criteria being role-plays that are set during an ambulance and pre-hospital operation).

6) The facilitator then leads the wider group in a reflection around the following questions after the role-plays:
   • What do you think is the objective of this activity?
   • What can we learn from seeing three alternative ways of reacting in one situation?
   • What worked in the different situations, and why?
   • For those who experienced the situations that were acted out, was it familiar or strange to see the situation played out and why?

7) In closing, the facilitator asks the participants to use one minute to think about one skill, technique or strategy that they will remember from this exercise. They write them down on a piece of paper with their name on it, before sharing their one take away with the rest of the group. The facilitator collects the papers in order to include this statement on the back side of their individualised certificates of completion.

**ACTIVITY 8: TAKEAWAYS**

The objective of this activity is to summarise the main takeaways from this session and provide an opportunity for the participants to jointly reflect and write down what they have learned.

**Group work:** The facilitator asks the participants to individually write down one recommendation that they think is the most important from each of the activities. Next, discuss these recommendations in small groups and present to the whole group a listing of the agreed takeaways.

**Plenary agreement:** Agree and consolidate the key elements to be retrieved from this session. These are collected by the facilitator to bring to the last session on recommendations to management and supportive action cards.

**WRAP-UP**

In the plenary: Conduct a brief summary from the facilitator and participants about how the day has been.

**TIP** Positive attention and recognition both develop people’s self-respect and make them feel good. In addition, they increase the likelihood of participants keeping up the good work. Positive feedback has the following effects:
   • Participants learn best through recognition, encouragement and specific feedback
   • Consistent encouragement directs attention from defeat to mastery
   • Skills training through encouragement and recognition promotes mastery and self-confidence
   • Learning through encouragement and recognition has no negative side effects

See page 147 for a list of resources and further reading for this session
SESSION 5: STRESS AND PSYCHOSOCIAL WELLBEING

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session the participants will:

• better understand how events experienced during their service can affect psychosocial wellbeing

• have a better awareness of the possible signs of stress and post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSIs)

• be familiar with actions that can be taken to mitigate the risks of stress

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**PROPOSED SESSION TIME**

3 HOURS 45 MINS
**INTRODUCTION**

The facilitator introduces the topic based on a selection of the information below. This section provides participants with a basic understanding of how events experienced during their service can affect their psychosocial wellbeing. It aims to familiarise participants with some of the possible and changing signs of stress and PTSIs. The section should end with recommendations on how to work towards better procedures and practice on this within the ambulance and pre-hospital services.

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**PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR**

- Make a plan/agenda for this session
- Familiarise yourself again with the risks, gaps and needs collected during sessions 1 and 2
- Together with the employer/management, map existing procedures and practices for the prevention and management of stress and post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSIs). Identify gaps in order to tailor the training
- Gain a basic understanding of how the culture is related to discussing psychosocial health and care in the context where the training will be implemented
- If culturally appropriate, an experienced ambulance provider should be identified to describe an incident that affected his/her psychosocial wellbeing

**TIP** The facilitator can describe his or her own experience, as there may be reluctance to talk about this topic. It can be very powerful if the facilitator is prepared to open up, as this can encourage others to do the same.

- Acquaint with annex 5: Managing difficult reactions and disclosures

**Important!** Keep the information confidential and private. Preferably agree to this at the beginning of the meeting. Everyone should be advised not to share things in the meeting that they may feel uncomfortable with others knowing afterwards.

No pressure to talk. Respect people’s wishes if they choose not to share. If someone is not ready to talk, they can still experience and appreciate the presence of a supportive fellow human being with a caring attitude. It is important to never press for details, ask about the worst things that have been experienced, or to investigate unpleasant thoughts or feelings. This can distort or even damage the natural healing process.

Listen actively, with respect and empathy.

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**Post-traumatic stress injury (PTSI) is a non-clinical term that encompasses a range of mental health injuries, including some operational stress injuries (OSI), anxiety and depression. It characterises symptoms as injuries caused to ambulance providers as a direct result of their work. PTSI can have a lasting impact on a person’s ability to do their job, as well as affect their overall mental health and wellbeing.**

Why is this particularly important for ambulance providers? They are the most valuable resource that the ambulance and pre-hospital services have in their effort to reach and help people in need. In order for ambulance providers to be able to carry out their work and care for others to the best of their abilities, their own basic physiological and safety needs must be met.

Ambulance providers work in challenging situations, and often they put aside their own needs. At the end of the day, they often feel inadequately equipped to help patients with the tragedy they are facing. They can also be members of affected communities and work close to home. They may experience the same losses and grief in their families and communities as the recipients they support.

PTSIs should be prevented where possible and managed when they occur. Given the scope of this workshop, however, the focus will be on mitigating measures that can reduce both effects of stress and the prevalence of traumatic stress.

**What is psychosocial wellbeing?**

**From Psychosocial Centre | IFRC: Psychosocial wellbeing**

The term psychosocial reflects the dynamic relationship between psychological and social processes. Psychological processes are internal: they include thoughts, feelings, emotions, understanding and perception. Social processes are external and include social networks, community, family and environment. It is important to remember that what happens in one of these areas will affect aspects of the others. How we feel internally affects how we relate to the environment around us. Similarly, our traditions, customs, and community affect how we feel.

Psychosocial wellbeing depends on many factors: social, spiritual, cultural, emotional, cognitive and physical. The overlapping circles suggest that individual and collective wellbeing depends on what happens in a variety of areas and these are interrelated.

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38 tinyurl.com/329vr5tb | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org) p. 64
39 tinyurl.com/bfvmwr | Guidelines-for-supporting-volunteers-2.pdf (pscentre.org) p. 15
40 tinyurl.com/329vr5tb | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org) p. 18
41 tinyurl.com/329vr5tb | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org) pp. 15–16
Social: Social wellbeing refers to a sense of connectedness to others and feelings of belonging. Human beings are social by nature and a denial of access to social activities and social interaction can increase a person’s distress levels. For example, friends, family, relatives, social activities, sports and leisure groups and clubs, as well as support groups all contribute to social wellbeing.

Spiritual: Spiritual wellbeing refers to people’s feeling of connectedness and purpose in life. For example, following a religion often gives people a sense of meaning and connectedness to others who follow the same religion.

Cultural: Culture involves learned patterns of belief, thought and behaviour. Culture makes life more predictable. It influences the tools, types of shelter, transportation, and other physical items that are needed for psychosocial wellbeing. It influences our perception of what behaviour is considered normal or abnormal. It also influences standards of beauty, both of things and of people, and prescribes acceptable and unacceptable ways to express emotion. Culture evolves and changes over time. An example of how culture affects our wellbeing is in the simple act of how we greet one another, which makes us feel comfortable and safe as it is a mutual understanding of behaviour that connects us.

Emotional: This refers to how we feel and what we call our moods. Family and friends are part of creating the social structures that provide emotional wellbeing. Examples of emotions that lead to wellbeing are typically positive emotions such as happiness and hope.

Cognitive: Cognitive aspects concern functions of the mind, which includes thinking, learning how to learn, how to acquire information, and how to use this information. Examples of cognitive wellbeing are when we are able to understand and analyse problems and find solutions to challenges.

Biological: This refers to physical and mental health and the absence of disease and disorders. Examples of biological wellbeing are when we feel strong and rested.

Foundations for experiencing wellbeing:

Safety refers to being out of immediate danger and feeling safe in one’s physical environment and with the people in this environment. It also refers to basic needs such as food, shelter and water, as it is not possible to focus on emotional, social and other needs if these are not fulfilled first.

Participation refers to being able to participate in ongoing daily activities. It also refers to feeling that one has choice and some sense of control over one’s life.

Development refers to the belief that tomorrow will be better than today. It is closely connected to hope. In order to feel a positive sense of wellbeing, it is important to know and believe that life can and will be better in the future. This can be experienced, for example, by seeing positive changes such as rebuilding after an emergency, restoring of families if separated, re-opening of schools, communities coming together after terrorist attacks etc.

The facilitator goes through the session outline.

ACTIVITY 1: CONTEXTUALISING STRESSORS

Main issue to be highlighted: Not everyone who is exposed to stressors or a potentially psychologically traumatic event develops psychological trauma, but it is important for the individual’s wellbeing that there is a culture where difficult experiences can be talked about without stigma. Team members should be aware of how they receive such information when it is shared with them.

Potentially psychologically traumatic event (PPTE) (also known as psychologically traumatic stressor) is a stressful event that may cause psychological trauma. The term includes the word potentially to emphasise the importance of individual perception within a specific context when determining whether an event is a psychologically traumatic stressor.

It is vital to recognise that major events are not the only cause of psychosocial trauma. Ambulance providers are exposed to so-called minor stressors daily, such as patient deaths, accidents, domestic violence, etc. The sum of these can potentially also lead to unhealthy stress.

The facilitator should emphasise that an acute stress reaction is a normal response after an abnormal event. If the symptoms do not subside after a week, this is a sign of progression into a mental health condition. Understanding this can encourage people to talk about their normal response and accept it themselves.
Psychosocial Centre | IFRC: Risks to staff and volunteer wellbeing

Personal risks
- Idealistic or unrealistic expectations of what they can do to help others
- Feelings of guilt in realising limitations, or if someone dies, or from prioritising their own needs for rest or support
- Moral or ethical dilemmas when having to choose who to help first

Interpersonal risks
- Feeling unsupported by colleagues or supervisors
- Experiencing difficult dynamics within a team
- Working with team members who are stressed or burned out

Risks related to working conditions
- Having to perform physically difficult, exhausting and sometimes dangerous tasks
- Being expected (or expecting themselves) to work long hours in difficult circumstances
- Feeling detached from their own family and home life because they cannot share the details of their experiences at home
- Feeling they did not deal with their tasks well enough or that they were not adequately prepared
- Witnessing traumatic events or hearing survivors’ stories of trauma and loss

Risks related to organisational issues
Having an unclear or non-existent job description or an unclear role in the team
- Lack of information sharing
- Being poorly prepared or briefed for tasks
- Lacking boundaries between work and rest
- Working in a context where wellbeing is not valued, and efforts are not acknowledged or appreciated

Plenary discussion: The facilitator writes the following definition of stress on a flip chart and asks participants who recognise this feeling to raise their hands:

Stress is the feeling experienced when someone perceives that “demands exceed the personal and social resources the individual is able to mobilise” (Richard S. Lazarus – 1966).

The facilitator emphasises the importance of understanding and accepting that everyone is different and has different experiences. The experience of stress and remembering traumatic episodes can be difficult to talk about or even think about. For that reason, if someone does not want to talk, wants to leave the room or needs a private conversation, they should be given the opportunity along with the assurance that this is okay. Also highlight that participants should not share anything they might regret later.

The facilitator explains the difference between daily stress and posttraumatic stress injuries (PTSIs), but also the message that cumulative daily stress may result in PTSIs over time.

Normal stress activates our sympathetic system in a way that allows us to optimise our energy use; eustress is positive stress, when challenge and resources are in balance; distress is negative stress, when the challenge overwhelms our resources.

Posttraumatic stress injuries (PTSIs) occur in situations when life or body integrity are at stake and we do not have enough resources to cope. In these situations, stress reactions become so extreme that the connections between our frontal lobe (responsible for problem solving), our amygdala (responsible for evaluating stressors as potentially life threatening) and our brain stem (responsible for instinctive fight, flight, freeze reactions and for automatic routines) are partially or completely cut.

That’s why, in stressful situations, we react automatically (if well trained) or instinctively (fight, flight, freeze). Afterwards, we often ask ourselves repeatedly why we reacted the way we did and if we acted correctly.

Trauma is a vital discrepancy between situational threat and one’s own coping abilities which can lead to shattered assumptions about the world and the self.

42 tinyurl.com/329vr58h | PFA-Module-4-Group.pdf (pscentre.org).p.18
43 tinyurl.com/m8vkxhx5 | Stress: Appraisal and Coping (springer.com).
44 tinyurl.com/mr7vcvwd | Definition/ Entstehung Flucht & ResilienzFlucht & Resilienz (fluchtundresilienz.schule)
ACUTE REACTIONS

Reduced frontal lobe activation
- Being overwhelmed, feeling helpless, not able to set priorities and plan ahead
- Cognitive impairment; stick to first idea and not able to see alternatives

High sympathetic arousal
- Hyperactivity
- Not feeling hunger
- Thirst
- Pains

Self-protection
- Dissociation
- The sensation of perceiving reality as strange/as if in a film
- Time appearing in slow motion
- Amnesia
- Shock
- Perceiving the self from outside the body

As an example, situations of physical violence are often experienced as traumatic and therefore activate traumatic stress reactions.

Reasons for PPTE:
One may have been subjected to death, threatened with death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence and so on resulting from:
- Direct exposure
- Witnessed, personally
- Indirectly, by learning that a close relative or close friend was exposed to trauma. If the incident involved actual or threatened death, it must have been violent or unintentional
- Repeated or extremely indirect exposure to conflicting details about the incident(s), usually during professional duties (e.g. ambulance providers assembling body parts; professionals repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). This does not include indirect non-professional exposure through electronic media, television, films or images

The facilitator asks the participants to name examples of PPTEs. Examples for the facilitator to suggest given the contextual realities:
- Exposure to gun fire or explosions
- Experiencing something terrible happening to someone you know or who looks like someone you know
- Witnessing a lot of suffering and damage
- Failing to rescue someone
- Constantly feeling like you are not able to do enough
- Exposure to intense workload, tension and pressure over longer periods of time
- Having near death or perceived near death experiences

Participant presentation: If appropriate, an experienced ambulance provider describes an incident that affected him/her, what effects this experience had psychologically and how this manifested itself physically or through altered behaviour. This can help promote openness around a potentially stigmatised subject, while contextualising the issue.

Group work: The facilitator divides the participants into groups of three to four people and asks them to discuss the following question: What are the main causes of stress in your specific working environment?

After 15 minutes, the facilitator asks the groups to list the stress signs that they are aware of, or more broadly: How can stress be detected?

The list of signs of stress does not need to be exhaustive, but the more examples that are provided, the better. The aim is for participants to connect the experience of stress in their working environment with the effects it has on their body and mind.
In their own words: from an ambulance provider

EXPLOSION IN FRONT OF A PRIMARY SCHOOL

The incident
I work in a city at war and witness violence on a daily basis. Healthcare personnel are at risk of attack. There are no security personnel or guards at the hospital to prevent attacks or assaults, which makes things worse.

The scariest, most difficult incident I have ever witnessed happened when I was the resident doctor in the Emergency Department (ED) of a hospital next to a primary school. When children were leaving school, a car parked in front of it blew up. Shrapnel scattered in all directions. The area around the schools is closed off with concrete barricades so it’s hard for ambulances to get in.

One terrorist attack usually follows another – often when people gather around the casualties to offer assistance. This is exactly what happened. A man was calling out to gather frightened children to show them the way out. When they did so, he blew himself up. It all happened in front of me and it was difficult to work out what to do.

Should I start helping the children while everyone, myself included, was yelling: “Watch out from a second explosion”?

Do I wait in the ED to help whoever comes in, knowing how hard it would be to reach the children and bring them there?

Do I run away and leave because the second explosion might happen in front of me?

Ultimately, the hardest part was deciding who to help first, especially since the paramedics and surgeons took 45 minutes to arrive.

How were risks mitigated?
After the shock, I mustered up strength and tried to get the hospital workers to assemble in a nominally safe zone.

Meanwhile, I asked the people in charge of the warehouses to bring me the biggest quantity of bandages and IV fluids possible.

I divided tasks according to the number of workers in the hospital. One of the most important things was to give someone the task of identifying the names of the children.

As I said, it was almost impossible to work out the right thing to do. We are ready for casualties, but in all my years of experience, I have never been exposed to more than 30 casualties at once. Explosions and blasts are the most difficult incidents to deal with, especially when hundreds of children are involved. I guessed we would receive all the casualties because we were so close to the attack.

We were organised and fast. But when the parents came, they were confused and some became violent. This hampered our work to begin with.

I asked parents whose children were ok to help by calming down frightened kids and putting on plasters. They took less serious cases to less-crowded hospitals. We admitted a number of patients to prepare them for surgery before the surgeons arrived.

No measures were taken to prevent psychological trauma for employees. We all returned to work the next day and are still shaken by what happened. Some of us cry as soon as the incident is brought up.

I still keep the list with the names of the children on it. I visited some of them at home. A lot of them have disabilities now.

In training, we learned how to handle similar incidents, but I wasn’t prepared to see so much violence and so many casualties.

Lessons learned
The delay was caused by the security barricades, which were originally put in place to prevent such blasts.

Future consequences
After the incident, I wanted to know what the correct procedures would be in a situation like this. I have been deeply affected by this incident. I’ve suffered sleepless nights, a lack of focus and nightmares because of it. It is still difficult for me to think about.

PSS | IFRC: a guide to psychological first aid

LOOK for
• Information on what has happened and is happening
• Who needs help
• Safety and security risks
• Physical injuries
• Immediate basic and practical needs
• Emotional reactions

LISTEN refers to how the helper
• Approaches someone
• Introduces oneself
• Pays attention and listens actively
• Accepts others’ feelings
• Calms the person in distress
• Asks about needs and concerns
• Helps the person(s) in distress find solutions to their immediate needs and problems

46 tinyurl.com/ybhv78bp | 12007_psc_pfa_guide_T2_samlet_low.pdf (pscentre.org) p. 14
Plenary discussion: One group shares the identified causes of potentially psychologically traumatic events (PPTEs) and another shares the identified signs of post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSIs). These are written down on a flip chart and the remaining groups are given the opportunity to comment with additional causes and signs.

The facilitator may suggest some of the signs listed in the box below if they are not mentioned.

These symptoms may occur in a light, mild or severe way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSS</th>
<th>IFRC: Signs &amp; Symptoms of Distress</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHYSICAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Problems with sleeping</td>
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<td>Stomach problems like diarrhoea or nausea</td>
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<td>Rapid heart rate</td>
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<td>Feeling very tired</td>
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<td>Muscle tremors and tension</td>
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<td>Back and neck pain due to muscle tension</td>
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<td>Headaches</td>
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<td>Inability to relax and rest</td>
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<td>Being frightened very easily</td>
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<td><strong>MENTAL</strong></td>
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<td>Poor concentration</td>
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<td>Feeling confused</td>
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<td>Disorganised thoughts</td>
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<td>Forgetting things quickly</td>
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<td>Difficult making decisions</td>
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<td>Dreams or nightmares</td>
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<td>Intrusive and involuntary thoughts</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPIRITUAL</strong></td>
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<td>Feelings of emptiness</td>
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<td>Loss of meaning</td>
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<td>Feeling discouraged and loss of hope</td>
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<td>Increasingly negative about life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doubt</td>
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<td>Anger at God</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alienation and loss of sense of connection</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BEHAVIOURAL</strong></td>
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<td>Risk-taking e.g. driving recklessly</td>
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<td>Overeating or undereating</td>
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<td>Increased smoking</td>
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<td>Having no energy at all</td>
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<td>Hyper-alertness</td>
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<td>Aggression and verbal outbursts</td>
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<td>Alcohol or drug use</td>
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<td>Compulsive behaviour, e.g. nervous tics and pacing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Withdrawal and isolation</td>
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47 tinyurl.com/bfcyrmte | Guidelines for supporting volunteers-2.pdf (psccentre.org) P.7
**ACTIVITY 2: CONTEXTUALISING STRESS MANAGEMENT**

**Main issue to be highlighted:** Stress does not need to be something we simply experience; it can be something that we manage. This implies taking measures to ensure some level of control over the experience of stress and to try to prevent or mitigate the development of PTSIs.

**Introduction:** The facilitator emphasises that there are different strategies for preventing and reducing stress. The organisation should identify and tailor training that can mitigate the psychological impact of PTSIs based on the needs of the ambulance staff.

**Intervention principles:**
- Enhance internal and external safety
- Strengthen coping mechanisms and resources

The facilitator guides the participants in a discussion around the following question: Bearing in mind the effects of stress just discussed, how can your stress levels negatively affect your safety, that of your team and that of the patient?

**Group work:** The facilitator divides the participants into three groups, each tasked with discussing a different question:

- **Group 1:** Identify what you as an individual can do to manage your own stress
- **Group 2:** Identify what you as a team member can do to reduce stress at your workplace
- **Group 3:** Identify what measures can be implemented in your work environment to reduce stress levels among the ambulance providers

**Plenary discussion:** Each group presents their conclusions in the plenary. The facilitator suggests additional measures from the three adjacent boxes. Tell participants that, in the upcoming discussion, they will be asked to score the measures with regards to their impact and relevance in context.

**Suggested measures that an individual may take to manage stress:**
Not all of these may be applicable in every emergency context or cultural setting and are provided as examples only.

- Take care of yourself, feed yourself and exercise
- Limit your alcohol and tobacco intake
- Share your feelings with colleagues that you trust or your supervisor after disturbing incidents or after each work shift

**Suggested measures that team members can take to reduce stress in their work unit:**
There are many benefits to developing peer support systems. Early-stage peer support can prevent major problems by helping people develop personal coping skills. This is an active process where you create time and space to talk to each other about how you are feeling, the challenges you all face, and your different coping mechanisms. Peers are people who have something in common and by forming support groups, peers gather their knowledge, perspectives and experiences to benefit each other.

Not all of these may be applicable in every emergency context or cultural setting and are provided as examples only.

**Peer support can provide:**

- Informal support both during and after work
- A formal framework for discussing work and solving problems together
- Space to talk. If culturally acceptable, you can share your feelings and thoughts with someone you feel comfortable with
- Support when you’re both out in the field, with someone to check in on how things are going
- An opportunity to listen to others and share knowledge
- An opportunity to encourage and support your peers and be available in a non-intrusive way
- Confidentiality as a cornerstone for this support
- Non-intrusive follow-ups to professional care, for instance when the support received does not restore well-being, when very disturbing behaviour or strong signs of trauma arises

**Ambulance and pre-hospital services often run on ‘heroes’ who continue shift after shift, especially in emergencies.**

- Continue to perform routine tasks, such as going to work, cooking, showering, and spending time with family and friends
- Find a healthy way to vent that works for you, for example through exercising or expressing yourself through writing
- Seek professional advice when you feel like your own self-care is not being sufficient to restore your psychosocial wellbeing
- Do not withdraw socially
- Do not self-medicate
- Seek professional healthcare advice and support
- Take a break (if possible) when you feel your tolerance levels are dropping
Important! Referrals should not be a "last resort" to help a colleague.

Suggested measures that can be implemented in your station to reduce stress levels among ambulance providers:

Before attending incidents:
- Prepare the ambulance providers for tasks with adequate training and resources
- Explain all the details of the mission so that all team members know what to expect and if they will be able to handle it
- Support less experienced colleagues, and do not expect them to undertake roles better performed by senior colleagues such as breaking news of a death
- Establish buddy systems to ensure that everyone has at least one colleague that looks after them

During the incidents:
- Team members who show worrying signs should be cared for by a more experienced team member
- Team leaders should preferably have received at least basic training in how to identify and handle such situations

After the incidents:
- Facilitate time for ambulance providers to recover, reflect and assess how they can improve future responses
- Ambulance providers should have access to follow-up after traumatic and stressful experiences. They should be able to access support systems anonymously if they wish
- Follow up with any referrals to psychosocial support professionals for further assistance

In general:
- The service can organise regular retreats or opportunities for colleagues to participate in social activities. Smaller teams can organise these themselves
- PPTEs and PTSIs can be included as central topics in meetings, with the aim of removing the stigma that is sometimes associated with such conditions. Sessions should seek to represent potentially psychologically traumatic events as a normal reaction to abnormal situations

Plenary discussion: Participants are asked to score the measures that they believe to be most impactful and relevant in their contexts. Those with the highest score are recorded by the facilitator, to be shared with management as recommendations for improving procedures and practice that would mitigate risks of PPTEs and PTSIs.

ACTIVITY 3: TAKEAWAYS

The objective of this activity is to summarise the main takeaways from this session and provide an opportunity for the participants to jointly reflect and write down what they have learned.

Group work: The facilitator asks the participants to individually write down a couple of recommendations that they think are the most important from each of the activities. Next, discuss these recommendations in small groups and present to the whole group a listing of the agreed takeaways.

Plenary agreement: Agree and consolidate the key elements to be retrieved from this session. These are collected by the facilitator to bring to the last session on recommendations to management.

WRAP-UP

In the plenary: A brief summary from the facilitator and participants about how the day has been.

TIP Round of recognition: end the section with a round where everyone briefly speaks about a specific situation where another person in the group has made a difference for themselves or said something interesting and instructive. Such a round sharpens the attention to all the little things that contribute to the feeling of safety and community.

See page 148 for a list of resources and further reading for this session
SESSION 6:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTION CARDS

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this session the participants will:
• have compiled a set of recommendations for operational management
• have made contextualised action cards in pocket format

SUGGESTED SESSION OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>PROPOSED TIME MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>Presentation of the rationale for this session, and how participants will be involved</td>
<td>5 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Consolidating what has been learned through all the previous sessions</td>
<td>Group work and plenary agreement on takeaways to be included in the recommendations to management</td>
<td>1 hour 20 mins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations for management</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Action cards for pockets</td>
<td>Group work and plenary agreement on content (including suggestions for design and layout)</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and closure</td>
<td>Evaluation of the training and ways forward</td>
<td>20 mins</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PROPOSED SESSION TIME

2 HOURS 45 MINS

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FACILITATOR

• Make a plan/agenda for this session
• Collect and assemble all takeaways from the completed sessions. Make them available for the participants as handouts or equivalent

Important! Revisit the agreement with management before starting this session. Make sure that you are within the framework of what is agreed, in order to maintain commitment and support for the follow up of the training.
INTRODUCTION TO THIS SESSION

Throughout a response, all ambulance providers should be asking themselves: Is this scene safe enough? Since the scene is rarely safe, reasonable precautions should be taken to mitigate risks to the patient, ourselves and the bystanders.

This training has provided some examples and resources related to how ambulance providers can prepare for a safer response by improving their Code of Conduct, training on situational awareness, de-escalating tense situations at the scene and in other ways. Given how much the specific context influences how the ambulance providers should respond, including the ambulance and pre-hospital services own specific capacities, it is important that the participants themselves flag what in this training was of particular relevance to them.

In addition, a prioritised set of recommendations will be shared with operational management after the training. The extent to which these recommendations can and will be followed up will vary from one context to another, so it is worth reminding the participants that even if this follow up takes time, they are left with valuable knowledge on how to mitigate risks and make the scene safer.

The facilitator reminds the participants of the objectives of the training:

• To equip ambulance providers with simple, practical skills to improve their security and mitigate the impact of threats and violence
• To offer a starting point for organisations that provide ambulance and pre-hospital services who want to review and reinforce their existing procedures in terms of preparedness and security management

TIP
For reflection/discussion prior to carrying out the final activities, ask the class: What can you as a person, you as a team and your organisation do to make your workplace safer? (For example: emergency plans, protection measures, clear statements from the organisation, etc.) Think about strategies that can be developed on each of these levels.

ACTIVITY 1: CONSOLIDATING WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED THROUGH ALL THE PREVIOUS SESSIONS

To ensure concrete results that can contribute to a safer delivery of healthcare, the facilitator has been collecting key takeaways and recommendations produced by the participants throughout the training. There should be key takeaways and recommendations from all the sessions conducted in the training.

Introduction: The facilitator presents and distributes the list of the key takeaways to the participants.

Group work: The facilitator divides the participants into groups of three or four. From the list provided, the groups discuss which recommendations they want to bring to their operational management and why. There may be many recommendations collected, but selecting too many may be counterproductive as it may be difficult for management to dedicate sufficient time and resources in following all of them up.

TIP
The list should not be too long. It can also be categorised or ranked in order of priority.

Plenary discussion: Based on the previous group discussion, the participants should all agree on the recommendations that they believe to be the most important. They must also ensure that these are realistic and as specific as possible.

The facilitator will compile these key recommendations and integrate them into the training report that will be shared with operational management.

ACTIVITY 2: ACTION CARDS FOR POCKETS

An action card is a support tool that helps an ambulance provider to implement necessary measures in the right order and can help raise awareness about what factors make the scene unsafe. It is an operationalisation of the contingency plan. The purpose is to ensure that all necessary measures are carried out regardless of the type of incident you are facing.

Important! Ensure close collaboration with the management in the development of the action cards. The proposals produced in this group must be reviewed and revised by operational management. It is important that the action cards are quality assured, in line with existing SOPs. This is to avoid developing parallel practices that are potentially harmful and so that the action cards can be used by the entire organisation if deemed relevant.

Event-specific, or in general?
We recommend that the card is general, i.e. that it describes work tasks to be performed regardless of the type of event in question. There are several reasons for this. The card must be updated, and this happens continuously in connection with organisational development and contextual changes. A general card is easier to update than a card specified for each conceivable type of event.
**TIP** Simple language: write concisely, almost in the form of keywords, and be specific.

**Individual work:** The facilitator asks the participants to reflect on what information the action card should include and how it should look. Participants are tasked to write down at least three ideas each about what is important to include on the action card. If comfortable, participants can share their points in the plenary.

**Group work:** The facilitator divides the participants in groups of three or four to discuss the ideas for inclusion and how they see the end result. Each group will present a suggestion of how they think the action card should look and what it should include.

**Plenary discussion and agreement:** The facilitator leads the discussion based on the previous group presentations. The outcome should be a consensus on what the action card should contain and how it should be structured and formatted.

The facilitator presents the agreed proposal to the operational management for review and audit. As previously mentioned, management must always decide the content and appearance of the action card to ensure that the information is in line with current procedures and can be used for ambulance providers throughout the organisation. The action cards should ideally be made in pocket format and in solid material (e.g. laminated).

**EVALUATION AND CLOSURE**

Evaluation is about measuring the effect of the training. Have the participants achieved their goals?

**TIP** For an example of an evaluation template, see annex 7 on p.175

You can do evaluations before, during and after the training, both for the programme itself, but also to evaluate your own role and efforts. Is there anything you want to change for the next workshop in terms of your facilitation, your preparations or anything else related to your role as a facilitator?

**EVALUATION DIAGONAL**

The facilitator presents the expectations collected in the first session of the workshop and reviews which were met, and which were not met.

**PURPOSE**

- Evaluation
- Examine the participants’ assessment of what they have learned and what this might mean to them

**HOW**

- Ask participants to imagine a line running diagonally through the room, from one corner to the other. The endpoints of this line are the corners
- The facilitator gives a statement, such as:
  - “I believe that what I learned about conflict management will change the way I interact with patients”
  - “I believe I can actively contribute to reducing the stress level at work”
- One corner represents denial of this statement (“not at all”) while the other corner represents confirmation of the statement (“totally agree”)
- The participants position themselves at the point along the line that reflects the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement
- The participants are encouraged to speak with each other to find out if they are placed correctly in relation to each other, what makes them stand where they do and so on
- When all the participants have found their place, the facilitator asks some of the participants questions to hear more about what they think about the position they have found on the evaluation diagonal. The dialogue with each of them can trigger further reflection

If there is time, repeat the activity with more statements, such as:

- “I think my life will change after this conflict workshop”
- “My interaction with patients and their relatives will improve as I now know better how to read their needs and understand their reactions”
- “This course has taught me a lot about conflict management”
- “After this workshop, I will deal with threatening situations and conflicts better”

The facilitator provides participants with a training evaluation template, annex 5, and asks them to complete it. When everyone has finished, collect the forms.

**WHAT’S NEXT?**

The facilitator informs the participants of the next steps that will be taken from their side.

After sharing a reflection about the group and the implementation of the training, the facilitator thanks everyone for their participation and says goodbye.
SESSION 0

Health Care in Danger (HCiD)
An initiative of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aimed at addressing the issue of violence against patients, health workers, facilities and vehicles, and ensuring safe access to and delivery of healthcare in armed conflict and other emergencies.

healthcareindanger.org

Emergency Healthcare in Insecure Settings
Learn how to implement appropriate security risk management measures to protect healthcare responders and communities during a public health emergency.

tinyurl.com/26ap8b7j

Protection: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies
Written by Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick, and published by the Overseas Development Institute in 2005, this provides important advice and insights to humanitarian practitioners involved in providing safety and protecting vulnerable people in war and disaster. It draws on and complements other training materials and gives practical advice on how to think through the various elements of protection-focused programming in four clear steps: assessment; programme design; implementation; monitoring and evaluation.

tinyurl.com/2p9b7na3

The Sphere Training Package
Produced by The Sphere Project (2004), this contains useful information on The Humanitarian Charter and includes training materials on refugee, human rights, and international humanitarian law.

tinyurl.com/b7e9tvz5
SESSION 0

IFRC: Stay Safe
This features checklists and tips to help you conduct site security assessment for residential and office sites, and describes the IFRC minimum security requirements that apply.
tinyurl.com/yp3j5vsx

Insecurity insight: Attacks on Healthcare
Healthcare workers and health facilities are frequently targeted in conflict zones with devastating consequences for civilians and access to healthcare. Health workers and facilities are also targeted during public health emergencies. Insecurity Insight monitors open sources for information on events that interfere with healthcare delivery.
tinyurl.com/26ap8b7j

Reach Out’s Training Kit on Refugee Protection
Provides comprehensive materials and resources on refugee protection and includes additional materials on gender-based violence and the protection of internally displaced people.
tinyurl.com/mts7nkdc

Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change
This document covers developing and conducting risk awareness and safer behaviour interventions to reduce the likelihood of casualties among staff, volunteers and the civilian population.
tinyurl.com/bxedwirth

Action Against Small Arms: A Resource and Training Handbook
Written by Jim Cole and Henry Smith (2003) and produced by International Alert, Oxfam GB, and Saferworld, this contains useful materials on developing an advocacy strategy and managing risk.
tinyurl.com/yvytnkfh

SESSION 0

The Oxfam Gender Training Manual
Written by Suzanne Williams (1994), this contains many useful exercises and materials, including materials specifically focusing on sexual and gender-based violence.
tinyurl.com/2p9cb7t7

The IASC Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings
Provides useful definitions and action sheets.
tinyurl.com/4nyzfl38

Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action
Guidelines for reducing risk, promoting resilience and aiding recovery.
gbvguidelines.org/en

First Aid in Armed Conflicts and Other Situations of Violence
A practical manual presenting the specific knowledge, skills and practices that first aiders should have to act safely and effectively when caring for people caught up in armed conflicts and other situations of violence, such as internal disturbances and tensions.
tinyurl.com/2p9bbk5

ICRC: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) app
Find the most recent legal documents on this app, available on iOS and Android.
SESSION 1

Health Care in Danger (HCID)
An initiative of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aimed at addressing the issue of violence against patients, health workers, facilities and vehicles, and ensuring safe access to and delivery of healthcare in armed conflict and other emergencies.
healthcareindanger.org

Protecting healthcare from violence – a legislative checklist
A checklist covering the main challenges related to the protection of health care during armed conflict and other emergencies.
tinyurl.com/2payhh6u

Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities
A training manual for Red Cross and Red Crescent facilitators to teach and sensitise personnel in health care facilities.
tinyurl.com/36uyfp7rm

Safeguarding Health in Conflict: Ineffective Past, Uncertain Future
tinyurl.com/3j43vvhz

Video: The Human Cost
A 14-minute video that can be used during this session to address the problem of violence against EMS.
tinyurl.com/yckjb253

SESSION 1

The World Health Organization (WHO) definition of violence
tinyurl.com/2p879hwk

The misuse of power as the basis of violence
International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) report which identifies misuse of power as the basis of violence.
tinyurl.com/uhd5swrb

A pilot study of workplace violence toward paramedics
An academic study to identify the percentage of paramedics who have experienced six different forms of violence in the workplace.
tinyurl.com/2bkw5nfu

Psychological First Aid Training (module 4)
A group training module offering support for Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.
tinyurl.com/329vr58h
Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations

- Reporting and monitoring security incidents: see pages 39–40.
- The concept of acceptable risk: see pages 14–15.

tinyurl.com/chrb5yeh

Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities

A training manual for health care personnel.

tinyurl.com/36uvpf7m

Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change

Guidelines to help better manage the risks associated with weapon contamination resulting from conventional weapons and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards.

tinyurl.com/yvzv68hc

NAEMT: Violence against EMS practitioners


tinyurl.com/83nkuyayx

WHO: Preventing & protecting against attacks

A Q&A regarding the Attacks on health care initiative.

tinyurl.com/49hesu5

JESIP: Joint Decision Model

Using the Joint Decision Model to make effective decisions.

tinyurl.com/2p9c3kwa

The National Decision Model

A risk assessment framework/decision-making process used by police forces in the UK. It provides five different stages that officers can follow when making any type of decisions.

tinyurl.com/yv5mup5a

What to do at checkpoints

Advice from the International News Safety Institute (INSI).

tinyurl.com/mr2wb7k3

Risk management – guidelines

ISO 31000: Guidelines, principles, framework and a process for managing risk. ISO standards: 6.7 Recording and reporting

tinyurl.com/uusddn9z

Safety and Security Incident Information Management (SIIM) for Staff

Learn how to report a safety and security incident to your organisation.

tinyurl.com/2p9ne6xh
SESSION 2

Definition: What is a near miss?
Definition as per the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (United States Department of Labor).

tinyurl.com/4b9y2xru

WHO: surveillance system for attacks on healthcare (SSA)
Live dashboard of attack types, including statistics and locations.

tinyurl.com/2frjb7av

What personal data is considered sensitive?
A checklist provided by the European Commission.

tinyurl.com/yc6c6bnj

Medical Ethics Manual
A comprehensive manual provided by the World Medical Association.

tinyurl.com/mryckfmf

Health Care in Danger: The responsibilities of healthcare personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies
A guide to help healthcare personnel adapt their working methods to the urgent demand of armed conflicts and other emergencies.

tinyurl.com/24du7ipj

SESSION 3

Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities
A training manual for health care personnel, with examples of various activities and role plays and how to organise them. See chapter on activities (page 40).

tinyurl.com/36wypf7m

Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations
Basic attributes and conduct of personnel (page 8) provides a set of examples of best practices for EMS.

tinyurl.com/chrb5yeh

Safer Access: A Guide for all National Societies
Developed by the ICRC. This contains a set of actions and measures which, when used with the right structure and in the right context, can increase acceptance, security and access to local communities and individuals in need.

tinyurl.com/3xuvf49w

Safer Access for all National Societies
Safer Access: Increasing acceptance, security and access to people and communities in need.

tinyurl.com/yk4uytsj

The Invisible Gorilla
Video: Harvard experiment from Simon & Chabris which shows how our intuitions deceive us. (1:22)

tinyurl.com/2p9f6na2
SESSION 3

Healthcare should never be in danger
A film which looks at practical solutions to protect healthcare workers and facilities around the world, and which shows that there are actions we can take to prevent violence against health workers.

isITethical Exchange
A knowledge base and community platform that drives responsible innovation through digital ethics technologies for PPDR.

Multicultural Awareness for Prehospital EMS Professionals
A manual provided by Washington Health Department.

Scenarios for reflection: Burial attacks in Sierra Leone
A video report of healthcare personnel attacked for conducting burials against the customary rules of the local communities in Sierra Leone (0:44).

Scenarios for reflection: Massacre in Guinea
Video: A report of healthcare personnel attacked for conducting burials against the customary rules of the local communities in Guinea (3:12).

SESSION 4

Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change
Guidelines to help better manage the risks associated with weapon contamination resulting from conventional weapons and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards.

Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities
See module 3 for more information on the de-escalation of the threat of violence (‘The dynamics of Escalation and De-escalation of conflict’).

Education for Peace
A useful website which provides a wide variety of activities, role-play and background information.

The Center for Nonviolent Communication
Website of the global organisation helping people peacefully and effectively resolve conflicts in personal, organisational, and political settings.
SESSION 5

Interpersonal Violence Prevention and Stress Management in Health Care Facilities
See module 3 for more information on the de-escalation of the threat of violence (‘The dynamics of Escalation and De-escalation of conflict’).

tinyurl.com/36uvi77r

Best Practice for Ambulance Services in Risk Situations
For more information on dealing with personal psychological trauma, see chapter 2.9 (pages 36–38).

tinyurl.com/chrb5yeh

IFRC Reference Centre for Psychosocial Support
Website and resources on psychosocial support from the PS Centre.

pscentre.org

WHO: Mental health
A WHO report on mental health and its role in achieving global development goals.

tinyurl.com/4kw8sapy

Open access paper: PTSI among at-risk workers

tinyurl.com/yeh9anen

SESSION 5

Canadian Institute for Public Safety Research and Treatment
A useful glossary of terms, for experts and the general public, which help to describe Psychologically Traumatic Event, Psychologically Traumatic Stress and Psychologically Traumatic Stressor.

tinyurl.com/2hmte747

An Action Plan on Posttraumatic stress injuries
An Action Plan which seeks to strengthen Canada’s Public Safety Personnel’s collective understanding of PTSI through research and data collection.

tinyurl.com/4kce9937

Training in Psychological First Aid
Three-day training to introduce participants to PFA in Groups – Support to Teams.

tinyurl.com/329vr58h

Early Interventions Following a Disaster
Advice for those responsible for providing psychosocial support for adults, children, families, communities, schools, workplaces and other groups.

tinyurl.com/2p8r4vc

Early interventions for trauma
An article from the British Psychological Society regarding early intervention for trauma.

tinyurl.com/y6k5w4e
SESSION 5

A Guide to Psychological First Aid
Developed for staff and volunteers working in situations where psychological first aid (PFA) may be relevant.

tinyurl.com/ffzm9k4h

Caring for Staff and Volunteers in Crises
Guidelines outlining different ways of giving recognition and psychosocial support to staff and volunteers deeply affected by crises they are responding to.

tinyurl.com/bfcymte
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING A RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AMBULANCE AND PRE-HOSPITAL SERVICES

The objective of conducting a risk assessment is to evaluate the level of risk posed by identified hazards or hazardous situations to ambulance providers. It should facilitate the identification of specific hazards and their level of risk and enable appropriate prioritisation of risk-mitigation measures.

1: UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE DELIVERY OF AMBULANCE AND PRE-HOSPITAL CARE

To begin with, it is important to understand the elements that comprise the concept of risk. The risk associated with a particular hazard depends on two primary factors:

• The severity of harm that could result from the hazard
• The likelihood of this harm occurring

In addition, this likelihood is a function of:

• Exposure to the hazard
• Occurrence of a hazardous event
• The possibilities of avoiding or limiting the harm

The elements of risk are illustrated in figure 11.

Figure 11: The elements of risk (same as figure 7, part 1, p. 13)

Related to the considered hazard

Environment of harm that can result from the considered hazard and the occurrence of a hazardous event

Exposure to a hazardous situation

Possibility to avoid or limit the harm
Assessing risks associated with the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital healthcare therefore involves two stages:

- Identifying a given hazard and assessing its potential severity of harm or impact on the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services, in terms of both the safety of ambulance providers and operational continuity perspectives.
- Assessing the likelihood of harm occurring from a hazardous incident, in terms of the exposure to the hazard, the frequency of such hazardous events and the possibility to avoid or limit the harm from such an event.

Risk = Severity x Likelihood

The assessment is best done in collaboration with colleagues and stakeholders to ensure that all known factors have been taken into consideration, thereby ensuring the assessment is as accurate as possible.

2: IDENTIFY THE SCOPE OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk management can be applied at different levels within an organisation: at the strategic level, operational level, programme level, project level, or for specific activities. It is necessary to clarify the scope of the risk assessment before the process begins. For example, in an organisation involved in the delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital healthcare, the assessment of strategic and operational risk to the organisation will normally be dealt with by the senior management, whereas the risk around specific activities will often be dealt with by those responsible for the activity.

The assessment procedure can be applied generically (i.e. for all ambulance providers) or specifically for each team or operation (depending on specific areas that are covered by different teams). It is advisable to conduct a generic risk assessment for all ambulance providers in the organisation (or branch), as well as specific risk assessments for those personnel and operations deploying to areas or conducting activities where exposure to specific hazards is likely.

3: ENSURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT

Before conducting the risk assessment there must be a proper understanding of the internal and external context in which the organisation operates. This includes the specific environment of the activity to which the risk-management process is being applied. This means that it needs to be done by or in collaboration with people who fully understand the organisation’s context (including the legal framework in which it operates) and its dynamics. This usually involves several people within the organisation.

4: DEFINE THE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

The criteria for identifying and evaluating risks must be defined and agreed before the risk assessment begins. Clear criteria are essential to support informed decision-making.

5: ASSESS THE POTENTIAL SEVERITY OF THE IMPACT OF AN INCIDENT

The assessment of impact severity is based on the nature of the hazard itself. It can be defined according to a predefined scoring criterion, ranging from negligible to catastrophic. See figure 12 for an example.

For example, when referring to the severity of impact or consequence of an incident, defining what is meant by a severe, a moderate or a negligible consequence. Likewise, when referring to the likelihood of a harmful incident occurring, defining what is meant by very likely, likely, etc. Activities 5 and 6 provide examples of criteria.

6: ASSESS THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INCIDENT

Once the potential severity of hazards has been assessed, the likelihood of harm should be judged. The likelihood of a given incident can be categorised as very unlikely, likely, possible, likely or very likely. The assessment of such probabilities will be based on:

- Exposure to the hazard (e.g. are there hostilities or regular or current armed violence, is the presence of checkpoints confirmed, or is the patient to be recovered located in a known hostile community?)
- Frequency of incidence of the hazard in question (e.g. are there any confirmed incidents or casualties in the area of focus for the risk assessment?)
- The possibility of avoiding or limiting the harm (i.e. what is the ambulance providers’ level of knowledge of risks and safe behaviour, have they had safer-behaviour training, what is their attitude to a given risk, what is their actual behaviour in hazardous environments, and are they able to avoid or limit harm through proactive risk-mitigation measures, such as getting a green light to operate from formal or informal authorities or finding alternative routes?)

The information for assessing likelihood should be gathered during the assessment stage, and include evidence of levels of exposure to the hazards, as well as data regarding...
frequency of occurrence of incidents, and formal and informal input on existing knowledge, attitudes and behaviour in relation to the hazards.

The likelihood of an incident occurring can be scored 1–5, ranging from very unlikely to very likely, using pre-defined criteria such as those below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of exposure</td>
<td>Not ever likely to be exposed</td>
<td>Not likely to be exposed in current circumstances</td>
<td>Possibility of exposure in certain circumstances</td>
<td>Exposed occasionally (e.g. weekly or monthly)</td>
<td>Exposed regularly (daily basis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of incidents</td>
<td>None heard of or confirmed</td>
<td>Few heard of but none confirmed</td>
<td>A few incidents but none recently</td>
<td>Recent incidents occasionally reported</td>
<td>Recent incidents often reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to avoid/limit harm</td>
<td>Self and others aware of risk and behaving safely (social norm)</td>
<td>Report self-aware of risk and usually behave safely but others not</td>
<td>Report aware of risk but not practising safe behaviour</td>
<td>Not aware of the risk or how to behave safely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average score is to be plotted on the risk matrix for the likelihood score where 1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = possible, 4 = likely, 5 = very unlikely. Total divided by 3 = average score.

It is advisable for the scoring to be done in conjunction with colleagues and stakeholders who have participated in the assessment process.

7: ASSIGN A RISK SCORE AND CATEGORY

The previous two steps have assessed the likelihood and severity of a given risk. These can be brought together to establish a risk score, which is the likelihood score multiplied by the severity score. The score can then be plotted onto a matrix, which shows the risk category for each person, team or group from high risk to low risk.

By evaluating these groups separately, giving them a risk score and plotting them all onto the risk matrix, those most at risk can be clearly and quickly identified and prioritised for risk awareness and safer behaviour activities and other risk-mitigation measures.

As examples, the matrices below show the results of an assessment of the risks associated with conventional weapons for ICRC staff and their operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK TO ICRC STAFF</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSEQUENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Life-changing injuries, fatalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Injuries requiring immediate pre-hospital and long-term clinical care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Injuries requiring immediate pre-hospital and clinical care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Injuries requiring clinical care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Minor injuries requiring no medical assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 13:** Example of predefined criteria for assessing the likelihood of an incident

**Figure 14:** Risk assessment matrix 1 – Assessing the risk of weapon contamination to ICRC staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK TO ICRC OPERATIONS</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSEQUENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Stop operations and evacuate staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Operations cannot continue; all movement stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Operations and staff limited to essential only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Operations continue with further risk mitigation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>No impact on operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 15:** Risk assessment matrix 1 – Assessing the risk of weapon contamination to ICRC operations

8: CONSULT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TO AGREE THE RISK CATEGORY AND IDENTIFY PRIORITY TARGET AUDIENCES

With all the information collected during the assessment, it is advisable to discuss and agree the risk categorisation on the risk assessment matrix as well as the priority target audiences and priority activities to be carried out to treat the risk with informed but impartial colleagues and/or other stakeholders. This is especially important if other risk
mitigation activities to facilitate safer behaviour involve the mobilisation of a number of other departments or organisations (notably those in charge of purchasing equipment and providing training).

This is the risk assessment completed. It should always be recorded with references or evidence for the risk scores that have been awarded.

9: Risk mitigation activities
The next stage is to identify, prioritise and plan the activities to mitigate the risk, i.e. to reduce the likelihood and/or the severity of an incident. The aim is that the target groups at risk will eventually be moved into a lower risk category on the risk assessment matrix.

10: Monitor the risk using the same risk assessment process
The risk assessment can be conducted again during and after the intervention as a part of the monitoring process to see if the risk has changed. A reduction in the risk score can be an indicator of success.

ANNEX 2:
EXAMPLE OF RISK-ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL

1. HOW TO IDENTIFY THE MOST RELEVANT HAZARDS THAT MAY IMPEDE THE SAFE DELIVERY HEALTHCARE

The idea here is to put in place a system that allows an internal consultation to take place, with the participation of all stakeholders within the organisation, and possibly also relevant external actors. The participants must be able to contribute, and either have their contribution integrated or, if not, be given an explanation as to why.

The system can be administered by one person or a group. The process must be transparent and documented, with outcomes communicated to participants in due course. Documentation should be available for consultation at the end of the process.

How formal the process is will depend on the size of your organisation, the numbers of stakeholders to involve (basically, anyone who has an informed opinion on the issue) and the organisation’s existing culture.

A simple and effective way to proceed is to organise a series of workshops. The first could be explanatory and gather a first round of suggestions. After that, stakeholders should be given enough time to reflect on the subject, based on their own experiences. They will then need a channel that lets them offer their feedback easily, possibly anonymously, before a clearly communicated deadline.

Once this first stage of consultation is over, the individual or group leading the process must consolidate and analyse the data, so the most relevant input is identified. It is essential that this part of the process is conducted in a transparent manner, and its outcome explained to participants.

Once a series of hazards is identified as those the organisation will focus on, a second workshop (or any other form of public consultation) should be organised to present the results and gain validation and ownership. As mentioned, it is essential that participants, as well as others that may have an interest in the process, have the opportunity to view the records produced throughout the consultation phase. These could take the form of minutes issued after each workshop, and a summary of the input gathered.
2. HOW TO IDENTIFY THE RISK LEVEL OF PROMINENT HAZARDS

Each organisation is likely to have a different estimation of what constitutes a catastrophic or moderate impact, and what is likely to happen or possible. Again, consultation is key during this phase, which allows the organisation to agree on categorisation of risks. The same principles apply: integration of the stakeholder contributions, transparency and accountability.

Assessing risks associated with the delivery of healthcare involves:

• Identifying the hazard and the potential severity of the impact (consequences) of an incident on ambulance providers and or delivery of healthcare

• Assessing the likelihood of an incident, given the frequency of previous occurrences, the vulnerability of ambulance providers to the risk, and their ability to limit or reduce any resulting harm

To achieve this, the organisation must agree on the criteria for evaluating the severity of the impact of an identified hazard, and a system for assessing the likelihood of each hazard. The objective here is to collectively reach a consensus on what indicators to use for each category. The impact scale ranges from “negligible” to “catastrophic”. Your consultations should allow you to fill the table (matrix) in figure 16 on page 174.

The score for likelihood combines several indicators: one for the level of exposure, one for the number of incidents and one for the capacity to avoid or limit harm.

Assessing risks that may impede the safe delivery of ambulance and pre-hospital services is a continuous process and should be regularly renewed. Defining the appropriate frequency of new assessments is the role of the organisation’s management.

ANNEX 3:
EXAMPLE OF A RISK MITIGATION MEASURE

In order to illustrate the risk mitigation process, we are going to use a made-up example and go through the process of addressing the risk associated with a hazardous situation. To this end, we will simulate a situation where ambulances are either slowed up or prevented from conducting their operations due to the presence of checkpoints in the area of operations.

CHECKPOINTS

Following a risk assessment, you identify the presence of checkpoints as hazards that can significantly hamper either the physical integrity of the ambulance providers, or the conduct of your operations.

As a result of internal consultations, you have rated the risk related to checkpoints 4E on the risk matrix as a VERY LIKELY hazard with a SEVERE impact (you and your organisation will need to have agreed ahead of the risk assessment process with clear indicators of SEVERITY). You have decided that you need to mitigate this risk to a lower, more acceptable level, so that your operations can be undertaken in a safer manner.

We have seen earlier that risks can be mitigated either by reducing the LIKELIHOOD of an event, or its SEVERITY. The risk treatment measures you will choose to implement will need to address either or both of those dimensions.

The most effective way to deal with checkpoints is to avoid them! In other words, reduce the likelihood of having to go through one. Having said this, you must consider the risk this lays on the patient who is waiting for treatment. Furthermore, if the ambulance reaches a checkpoint and then decides to turn around and drive off, the risk of being targeted and fired upon increases.

How can one reduce the likelihood of encountering a checkpoint when responding to an emergency call?

• By using alternative routes

This is easier said than done and implies an information management system is put in place that allows for gathering, storing, updating and sharing updated information. It also implies that this information is systematically used to choose a route to and from the incident location that is free from checkpoints.
By having a checkpoint lifted ahead of your intervention

This can be achieved by developing a trust relation with the group(s) in command of the checkpoint, and gaining the confidence that the leaders will be able to contact the people manning the checkpoint in time so that it is lifted by the time you reach it.

Can you think of more procedures that could contribute to decreasing the likelihood of encountering a checkpoint?

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to avoid having to go through a checkpoint. In such cases, it is important that you develop your own protocol aimed at reducing the severity of such encounters.

How can one reduce the severity of encountering a checkpoint when responding to an emergency call?

There are many protocols that have been developed over time by different organisations that provide guidance on handling checkpoint situations. General considerations include:

- Which documents are needed to pass a checkpoint?
- What information can be shared and what is protected?
- Who can be in the car?
- What would be considered irregular?
- How can the severity of the case being transported be explained to ensure agility when needed?

**What to do at checkpoints**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extracts from the International News Safety Institute (INSI) protocol relating to encountering checkpoints. INSI is an organisation that supports journalists to safely implement their work worldwide.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tinyurl.com/mr2wb7k3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**TIP** Where the ambulance service has an established dialogue with arms carriers, it could be interesting to undertake a joint simulation and highlight security challenges at checkpoints from a wider perspective.

The people manning the checkpoint may have been at the checkpoint for hours in a hot or cold climate with no air conditioning or heating. They may have had no food or water. You may be the first people they have seen today.

They may have been drinking, taking drugs or may even be children who have been taken from their families and also under the influence of drugs or alcohol. They can be very dangerous and volatile.

The checkpoint may be in an area where security forces are being targeted and therefore those manning it may be jumpy and afraid for their lives. Ensure you do nothing to give them the impression that you are a threat to them.

Your behaviour may directly influence your situation. Always be polite but alert. Avoid confrontation. You may be under time pressure, but they are not. Do not pressurise them just because you have a deadline. It should be established ahead of the mission who will be communicating with the people manning the checkpoint.

- Keep the vehicle windows up, doors locked. Do not get out unless ordered to do so.
- Wind down the window to speak just enough to be able to look them in the eye.
- Show them that you are not a threat. Keep your hands in sight and do not make any rash, quick movements. They may think you are going for a weapon.

When approaching an unknown checkpoint:

- The lead vehicle should warn the remainder of convoy.
- Appraise the situation.
- Turn off any music or other distractions within the vehicle.
- Agree on who is going to speak to those manning the checkpoint.
- Remove your sunglasses.
- Slow down (to first gear, 5 kph).
- Be prepared to stop, turn off the engine and pull on the hand brake.

Approaching a legal checkpoint, the soldiers or police may do the following:

- Check ID cards or passports.
- Visual security check of the interior (take your sunglasses off to confirm ID).
- Search the glove compartment.
- Search the vehicle.
- Conduct an underneath mirror search of the vehicle.
• Open the bonnet/hood and search the engine area
• Increase the search level if he/she is suspicious
• If the search is conducted using a dog, the driver should remain in the car and the vehicle doors must be kept closed

If you need to get away quickly and remember this comes with a huge risk:
• Turn around early
• If you can’t turn around early, drive through
• If you can’t drive through, reverse out
• If you can’t reverse out, run away

By implementing these measures, you will be able to reduce the risks associated with the presence of checkpoints. In order to be effective, these measures should be implemented in a systematic way. They should be widely spread throughout the organisation, ambulance providers should be trained on their implementation, and regular refreshers should be conducted internally.

ANNEX 4:
GUIDING NOTE ON INCIDENT REPORTING FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance on how to report on and monitor incidents of violence against healthcare. The collection and analysis of such data is crucial to develop evidence-based and adequate responses, including improving the security of health care personnel.

CAUTION: Given the potential sensitivity linked to collecting and managing data on violence against healthcare in the context of armed conflict and other emergencies, it is imperative to conduct a thorough risk analysis and ensure that adequate data protection mechanisms and data management system for processing such data within a given organisation are in place in line with the norms and guidelines provided in the ICRC’s *Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action and in the Professional Standards for Protection Work*. Data protection standards should be maintained at each step of information gathering and management processes. Attention should be given to the basic principles of data protection, data processing, data retention and security, applicable law and legal obligations, and mitigation of risks to individuals. Conducting a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is recommended to identify the risks for individuals, groups and organisations.

49 The Handbook seeks to help humanitarian organisations comply with personal data protection standards, by raising awareness and providing specific guidance on the interpretation of data protection principles in the context of humanitarian action, particularly when new technologies are employed. Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action (ICRC and Brussels Privacy Hub): [tinyurl.com/mrxthyr](https://tinyurl.com/mrxthyr). Professional Standards, accepted broadly within the humanitarian sector, provide a set of minimum but essential standards to ensure that protection work is conducted safely and effectively. Chapter 6 of the Standards focuses in particular on the issue of data collection. See Professional Standards for Protection Work.

50 See the Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action.
This sample template could be adapted to the different contexts; it is recommended to test it with a few employees/volunteers before its full implementation to modify the definitions according to the cultural norms. Prior to rolling out the use of this template, it is imperative to establish adequate internal systems and provide training to staff and volunteers to guide the process of collecting and reporting information about the incidents of violence.

According to the Professional Standards for Protection Work, the following norms should be respected when handling any type of data or information:

- Data on incidents of violence against health care must be collected only by trained staff/volunteers (standard 6.1).
- Information about incidents should be used only to inform adequate responses and enhance security of health care providers (standard 6.3).
- When collecting information, measures should be taken to avoid unnecessary burdens and risk for persons affected and/or witnesses (standard 6.4).
- Information should be gathered and processed in an impartial manner to minimise the risk of bias and discrimination (standard 6.5).

In addition, when dealing with sensitive personal data and/or sensitive protection data and information, additional protections should be applied to satisfy the following principles: legitimate basis and fair processing, limited purpose, confidentiality, data minimisation, limitation of data retention, data accuracy and data security (standards 6.9.-6.15.). Sharing, transferring and publishing of such data should also be subject to stringent procedures (standard 6.16.).

The following template was developed as a sample reference to monitor violence against health care by means of quantifying the magnitude of incidents of violence against health care and identifying the most prominent types of violence against health care in a given context. This information should be used to prioritise the response, the necessary corrective/preventive measures and their subsequent monitoring and evaluation.

### Definitions

The ICRC has identified the following forms of violence:

**Violence (physical or psychological)** against the wounded and the sick

Violence includes killing, injuring, extortion, sexual violence, harassing and intimidating patients or those trying to access health care; blocking or interfering with timely access to care; deliberate failure to provide or denial of assistance; discrimination in access to and quality of care; and interruption of medical care, among others.

The wounded and the sick include all persons, whether military or civilian, who are in need of medical assistance and who refrain from any act of hostility. This includes maternity cases, newborns and the infirm.

**Violence (physical or psychological)** against health care personnel

Violence includes killing, injuring, kidnapping, harassing, threatening, intimidating and robbing health care personnel; arresting anyone for performing their medical duties, including the impediment and arrest of forensic professionals while performing their forensic medical duties.

Health care personnel include doctors, nurses, paramedic staff, first-aiders, forensic medical staff and support staff assigned to medical functions; the administrative staff of health care facilities; and ambulance personnel.

**Violence against health care facilities**

Violence includes bombing, shelling, looting, forced entry, burning, shooting into, forced closure, takeover of the facility, encircling or other forceful interference with the running of health care facilities (such as depriving them of electricity and water).

Health care facilities include hospitals, laboratories, clinics, first-aid posts, blood transfusion centres, forensic medical facilities, and the medical and pharmaceutical stores of these facilities.

51 tinyurl.com/4jyumyse

52 The Joint Programme on Workplace Violence in the Health Sector, defines physical violence as the use of physical force against another person or group that results in physical, sexual or psychological harm. Includes assault/attack (intentional behavior that harms another person physically, including sexual assault/rape), beating, kicking, slapping, stabbing, shooting, pushing, biting, and pinching, among others. Psychological violence/emotional abuse (here referred as verbal violence) is defined as the intentional use of power, including threat of physical force, against another person or group that can result in harm to physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. Includes verbal abuse, bullying/mobbing, harassment, and threats. Joint Programme on Workplace Violence in the Health Sector (2003). Workplace Violence in the Health Sector, Country Case Studies Research Instruments Survey Questionnaire: tinyurl.com/3j9thgko
Violence against medical transport

Violence includes bombing, shelling, looting, burning, shooting into, takeover, and interference with the movement of medical transport. Medical transport includes ambulances, medical ships or aircraft, whether military or civilian, and any other vehicles transporting medical supplies or equipment.

INCIDENT REPORTING FORM TEMPLATE – VIOLENCE AGAINST HEALTH CARE

GENERAL / ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

DATE OF REPORTING: LOCATION (e.g. city):

NAME OF THE HEALTH CARE FACILITY/SERVICE PROVIDER (e.g. where the person who reports works):

ENSURE THAT NO PERSONAL NAMES ARE INCLUDED

INCIDENT-RELATED INFORMATION

DATE OF INCIDENT: TIME OF INCIDENT:

Site of occurrence

☐ Ambulance station
☐ Blood transfusion centre
☐ Clinic
☐ First aid post
☐ Forensic centre
☐ Hospital
☐ Medical warehouse
☐ Mobile unit (including vaccination mobile unit)
☐ National society branch
☐ Pharmacy
☐ Public space (e.g. street, road)

IF OTHER, PLEASE DESCRIBE ________________________________

Victim(s):

DESCRIPTION OF VICTIM(S) DESIGNATION NUMBER OF VICTIMS

☐ Ambulance personnel: driver
☐ Ambulance personnel: EMT
☐ Ambulance personnel: other
☐ Health care personnel: doctor
☐ Health care personnel: forensic specialist
☐ Health care personnel: nurse
☐ Health care personnel: pharmacist
☐ Auxiliary staff: security guard, other
☐ Patient/client (wounded or sick)
☐ Patient’s relative

IF OTHER, PLEASE DESCRIBE ________________________________

WERE THE PERSONNEL APPROPRIATELY IDENTIFIED?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don’t know
### Incidents Against Health Care Facilities or Medical Transport

**Affected/targeted structure:**
- [ ] Ambulance
- [ ] Health care facility
- [ ] Medicines
- [ ] Other medical transport

**Type of incident**
- [ ] Airstrike/bombing/shelling (use of weapon/explosives)
- [ ] Destruction/damage of health care facility or medical transport (i.e. burning, vandalism)
- [ ] Forced closure of health care facility
- [ ] Forced interference in health care facility (including armed entry)
- [ ] Misuse of distinctive emblems, signs, and signals
- [ ] Misuse of medical transport (including perfidy)
- [ ] Obstruction of passage (including at checkpoints, protests/strikes)
- [ ] Shooting at facility or medical transport
- [ ] Takeover of health care facility
- [ ] Theft/robbery

**Perpetrator**
- [ ] Patient/client
- [ ] Patient’s relative
- [ ] General public (aggressive crowds)
- [ ] Patient’s armed guards
- [ ] Armed group

---

**Were the health care facilities or medical transport appropriately and clearly identified with emblems or signs?**
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No
- [ ] Don’t know

---

**Description of incident**
State in simple words the facts that constitutes the act of violence, specifying if possible the probable causes of the incident (e.g. long wait times, refusal of care) Note: ensure that no personal names are included.
ANNEX 5:
PSS | IFRC MANAGING DIFFICULT REACTIONS AND DISCLOSURES

1 – RISK: If someone becomes agitated, the reaction may affect the group dynamics or increase the distress in others.
   Response: The first thing a psychological first-aid (PFA) facilitator can do is to normalise the situation and show understanding by expressing calmly that he or she understands this is difficult for the group member. If the person seems unable to focus on the present, the PFA facilitator can quietly instruct them to focus on something they can see or hear to help make them feel calmer. He or she may ask the group member to sit on a chair or stand on the floor and to focus on what it feels like and to describe what they feel.

2 – RISK: If someone withdraws, they will not benefit from the psycho-education and peer support.
   Response: The PFA facilitator can highlight that they would like to hear a little from everyone and that the group is a safe place for everyone to share, without calling too much attention to the person who is withdrawing. If the person continues to exclude him or herself, the facilitator can invite them by name to share directly, for example by saying, “Jim – would you like to share anything?” or by talking with the person privately after the meeting to hear what is troubling them.

3 – RISK: If someone becomes very angry and a conflict arises between two group members, this may lead to others feeling unsafe and heighten their feelings of distress. Peer support may then not function well in the group.
   Response: The PFA facilitator needs to stop the argument, acknowledge the feelings the individuals are having, but explain that this is not the appropriate time or place to continue with the argument.

4 – RISK: If someone starts to cry uncontrollably, it may lead others to feel heightened distress.
   Response: If appropriate, comfort the person by touching them, for example, by putting a hand on their shoulder or holding their hand. Invite them to tell you what is making them upset and give individual PFA. Allow expressions of grief and use this as an opportunity for psycho-education and invite others to share ideas of positive coping methods.

5 – RISK: If someone discloses something very sensitive, this may make the person vulnerable and lead them to feel uncomfortable.
   Response: There are different options on how to handle sensitive disclosures depending on the context. It is important not to let the person become more vulnerable, as this may make them feel unsafe and they may later regret sharing. If they disclose something very personal that is better discussed in private, the PFA facilitator should ask the person to stop sharing and instead invite them for an individual support session afterwards.

6 – RISK: If someone dominates a PFA and support meeting by talking a lot and not letting other participants share, or talks over the top of others and rejects other group members’ opinions, this can lead to others feeling inhibited and uncomfortable and discourages peer support.
   Response: The PFA facilitator can first try within the group itself to deal with a dominant group member by using basic helping skills. They can thank the person for their contribution and then invite others to share. For example, you can say:
   “Thank you, (name). What you are saying is very interesting, but I’d also like to hear from others in the group. Has anyone else had a similar or different experience?”

If the person does not respond in the group setting, then it may be necessary to speak to them on their own during a break or at the end of the meeting. Explain that it is important that everyone has a chance to talk and the opportunity to share and participate in the group. Be careful not to start by saying something negative to the person, as they may not listen to your suggestion. For example, you can say:
   “You have been very engaged in the discussions today, which is good. However, I want others to have the opportunity to be as engaged as you are. Let’s also hear from others about their experiences.”
### Annex 6: The Risk Assessment Matrix

**Assessing the Risk to Ambulance Providers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16:** Risk matrix assessing the risk of weapon contamination on the civilian population.

### Annex 7: Evaluation Template

#### Overall, how would you rate the content of the training?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comments:**

#### Overall Comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- The content was interesting and engaging.
- The training met the training objectives.

#### Knowledge and Skills: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Session 1: I have gained an understanding of what violence against healthcare workers is and what impact this has on ambulance providers.
- Session 2: I have now increased knowledge of the key elements in risk management and the importance of incident reporting.

**Comments:**
### KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS:

Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Session 3:** I have obtained new insight into how my behaviour can affect my operational security

**COMMENTS:**

**Session 4:** I have become aware of how I can deal with aggression and interpersonal threats and violence

**COMMENTS:**

**Session 5:** I have learned more about how to reduce the risk of stress and increase psychosocial wellbeing

**COMMENTS:**

### THE FOLLOWING HELPED MY UNDERSTANDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Group work
- Plenary discussions
- Plenary discussions
- Role play
- Power points

**COMMENTS:**

### THE FACILITATOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- The facilitator was knowledgeable about the topic
- The facilitator had good facilitation skills
- The facilitator was good at engaging the participants

**COMMENTS:**

### THE TRAINING AS A WHOLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- I have gained a better understanding of how to improve my security and mitigate the impact of threats and violence
- The learning environment was safe and inclusive
- The overall length of the course was appropriate

**COMMENTS:**
### How Did You Prepare for This Workshop?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I read Part 1</th>
<th>I read through the resources provided in Part 2</th>
<th>I read through the resources provided in Part 1 and Part 2</th>
<th>No preparations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explain in more detail how this influenced your learning, positively or negatively:**

### Did You Get the Necessary Information You Needed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Part 1?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the extra resources offered through the training manual</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Please give details on what you found useful/not found useful in Part 1:

### Please give details on what you found useful/not found useful in Part 2:

**What Went Well in the Training?**

**What Did Not Go Well in the Training?**

Thank you!